



Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6327th meeting

Wednesday, 2 June 2010, 10.30 a.m.
New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Heller	(Mexico)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Ebner
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbalic
	Brazil	Mr. Moretti
	China	Mr. Li Baodong
	France	Mr. De Riviere
	Gabon	Mr. Issoze-Ngondet
	Japan	Mr. Wada
	Lebanon	Mr. Salam
	Nigeria	Mrs. Ogwu
	Russian Federation	Mr. Kuzmin
	Turkey	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda	Mr. Mugoya
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Ms. Adams
	United States of America	Ms. Anderson

Agenda

Date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice (S/2010/255)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506.



The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice (S/2010/255)

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2010/271, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations.

I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2010/255, which contains the text of a note by the Secretary-General concerning the date of an election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to adopt the draft resolution contained in document S/2010/271 without a vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 1926 (2010).

The Security Council has thus concluded its business for this meeting.

The meeting rose at 10.35 a.m.



Security Council

Distr.: General
3 June 2010

Original: English

Official communiqué of the 6328th (closed) meeting of the Security Council

**Held in private at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday,
3 June 2010, at 10 a.m.**

In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General in place of a verbatim record:

“On 3 June 2010, the Security Council, pursuant to annex II, sections A and B of resolution 1353 (2001), held its 6328th meeting in private with the troop- and police-contributing countries to the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire.

“The Security Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries heard a briefing under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure by Mr. Choi Young-Jin, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire.

“Members of the Council, Mr. Choi and representatives of participating contributing countries had an exchange of views.”



Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6329th meeting

Thursday, 3 June 2010, 10.55 a.m.
New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Heller	(Mexico)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Ebner
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbalic
	Brazil	Mrs. Viotti
	China	Mr. Wang Min
	France	Mr. Araud
	Gabon	Mr. MOUNGARA MOUSSOTSI
	Japan	Mr. Takasu
	Lebanon	Mr. Salam
	Nigeria	Mr. Onemola
	Russian Federation	Mr. Kravchenko
	Turkey	Mr. Çorman
	Uganda	Mr. Mugoya
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ...	Mr. Quarrey
	United States of America	Ms. Anderson

Agenda

The situation in Côte d'Ivoire

Twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (S/2010/245)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506.

10-38676 (E)



Please recycle



The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Côte d'Ivoire

Twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (S/2010/245)

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Côte d'Ivoire, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the consideration of the item, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Bailly (Côte d'Ivoire) took a seat at the Council table.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Choi Young-Jin, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire.

It is so decided.

I invite Mr. Choi to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

I should like to draw the attention of members to document S/2010/245, which contains the twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a briefing by Mr. Choi Young-Jin. I now give the floor to Mr. Choi.

Mr. Choi: During the recent Security Council consultations on Côte d'Ivoire on 17 March, I reported that, for the immediate future, two issues — reunification and elections — were likely to dominate the Ivorian peace process.

Indeed, since last March, the pairing of reunification and elections has emerged as the governing dynamic of Ivorian politics. Unfortunately, it has produced a political impasse, which has proved to be as complex as it is delicate. The reason for this impasse is that the three major protagonists of the Ivorian crisis are now dealing with their core interests. The presidential camp wants reunification before elections; the opposition wants elections before reunification; and the Forces nouvelles wants identification before reunification. Moreover, by virtue of their ambiguities, the provisions of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement allow each of the three major protagonists to claim legitimacy in support of their respective position.

This political stalemate is hardly encouraging. Indeed, during the eight years since the outbreak of the crisis, perennial delays in implementing the various peace agreements have been a source of deep frustration for the Ivorian people as well as the international community. They are all the more so since the elections appeared to be within our grasp until several months ago. The full ownership of the peace process by the Ivorian parties, as defined in the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, comes with an obligation to make it work. The events of February and March 2010 demonstrated that the continuing failure to hold elections in Côte d'Ivoire and to materialize the reunification of the country contributes to heightening tensions and hampers constitutional, political, economic and social normalization.

It is against this backdrop that a technical assessment mission visited Côte d'Ivoire in April with a view to formulating options for the future of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). The mission considered four options: first, strengthening UNOCI's mandate to organize elections; secondly, withdrawing the Operation; thirdly, maintaining the status quo; and, fourthly, rationalizing the Operation's mandate and configuration.

The first option, the organization of elections by UNOCI, has been strongly recommended by the opposition. The second option, the withdrawal of

UNOCI, has been recommended by some observers who claim that the perennial delays of elections and reunification would no longer justify UNOCI's presence in Côte d'Ivoire. The third option, the status quo, has been recommended by the Forces nouvelles and the Facilitator on the grounds that, despite the failure to produce elections, the Ouagadougou Political Agreement has made a considerable contribution to the stabilization of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and to significant achievements, such as the mobile courts operation, the identification operation and the production of the provisional list, among others. The fourth option, the rationalization of UNOCI's mandate and configuration, has been recommended by some informed experts on Côte d'Ivoire.

Amid this complex and delicate situation, and after much reflection, it is recommended, as indicated in the twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (S/2010/245), which is before the members of the Council, that UNOCI maintain the current strength of its military and police components until the end of 2010. Should this recommendation meet with the approval of the Security Council, the Secretariat would conduct a review of the Ivorian peace process and submit further recommendations on the future of UNOCI before the end of this year.

Meanwhile, UNOCI shall maintain three priority objectives for the immediate future, as reported in my previous briefing (see S/PV.6284). These are, first,

maintaining peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire, including the protection of civilians as mandated by the Security Council in its resolutions 1894 (2009) and 1911 (2010); secondly, safeguarding past achievements in both the elections and reunification domains and continuing to provide support towards the implementation of these two crucial processes; and, thirdly, helping to establish the definitive electoral list as expeditiously as possible. This list constitutes a *sine qua non* not only for the holding of elections but also for the completion of the identification operation and the subsequent distribution of the national identity cards.

In particular, with regard to the first point, UNOCI and the United Nations country team in Côte d'Ivoire will continue their efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy for the protection of civilians. This strategy, once developed, shall allow UNOCI to fully implement the mandates given by the Security Council.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Mr. Choi for his briefing.

There are no further speakers on my list. In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I invite the members of the Council to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.



Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6330th meeting

Friday, 4 June 2010, 10 a.m.
New York


<i>President:</i>	Mr. Heller	(Mexico)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Ebner
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Vukašinović
	Brazil	Mrs. Viotti
	China	Mr. Wang Min
	France	Mr. Araud
	Gabon	Mr. MOUNGARA MOUSSOTSI
	Japan	Mr. Takasu
	Lebanon	Mr. Assaf
	Nigeria	Mr. Lolo
	Russian Federation	Ms. Eloeva
	Turkey	Ms. Dinç
	Uganda	Mr. Mugoya
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Quarrey
	United States of America	Mr. DeLaurentis

Agenda

The question concerning Haiti

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10-38889 (E)



Please recycle

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The question concerning Haiti

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Argentina, Canada, Chile, Guatemala, Haiti, Peru, Spain and Uruguay in which they request to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the consideration of the item, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mèrorès (Haiti) took a seat at the Council table; the representatives of the other aforementioned countries took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2010/277, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Guatemala, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Spain, the United States of America and Uruguay.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Turkey, Uganda, United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1927 (2010).

I now give the floor to the representative of Haiti.

Mr. Mèrorès (Haiti) (*spoke in French*): I thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the floor. On behalf of the Government and people of Haiti, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the Council, who have voted in favour of this resolution.

As the Council knows, the resolution is extremely important to us. At the most recent meeting of the Security Council on Haiti (see S/PV.6303), following the submission by the Secretary-General of his report (S/2010/200), our Prime Minister, Jean-Max Bellerive, strongly emphasized the importance that Haiti attaches to the issues covered in today's resolution. Haiti therefore welcomes the unanimous adoption of the resolution, which will certainly help the Government in the current difficult phase.

As the Council knows — and as is noted in the resolution — the country is now engaged in an electoral process. It is clear that, given the enormous losses we suffered following the earthquake of 12 January, including losses in the national police, the additional support provided for in the resolution will certainly enable the police to better ensure the security of the population during the electoral period.

As also indicated, we are now squarely in the rainy season in Haiti, which has created further difficulties for those still living in makeshift camps. Thus, the appeal to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to support the efforts of the Government to take better control of the situation both in the capital and in the provincial cities that have taken in internally displaced persons is very important. The Government would like to express its gratitude to the Council, which has shown great sympathy and understanding for Haiti's trials over the past six years.

Having said this, I would like to emphasize to the Council that the Government is resolutely committed to the electoral process, as was reiterated by our Head of State. Legislative and the presidential elections are planned for the end of November. Provisions have been made and are now being finalized with the support of the Organization of American States, the Caribbean

Community and, of course, the United Nations system. We have every reason to believe that these elections will take place in the best possible conditions thanks to the additional resources provided for in the resolution adopted today, thus ensuring the effective transfer of power in early February, as provided for in the Haitian Constitution.

With your permission, Sir, I would like to express to the Council once again, on behalf of the Government and people of Haiti, our gratitude for this resolution, which certainly represents an additional step in the assistance that we have received from the United Nations with a view to ensuring the stability and development of the country.

In this respect, I would like to note the successful outcome of the summit held this week in Punta Cana, in the Dominican Republic. On behalf of the Government, I thank the host country, the Dominican Republic, and all the other Member States that responded positively to the invitation of President Leonel Fernández and that once again reiterated their assistance and support for Haiti during the reconstruction phase.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 10.15 a.m.

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
4 June 2010

Original: English

Official communiqué of the 6331st (closed) meeting of the Security Council

**Held in private at Headquarters, New York, on Friday,
4 June 2010, at 10.30 a.m.**

In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General in place of a verbatim record:

“On 4 June 2010, the Security Council, pursuant to annex II, sections A and B of resolution 1353 (2001), held its 6331st meeting in private with the troop- and police-contributing countries to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.

“The Security Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries heard a briefing under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure by Mr. Atul Khare, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

“Members of the Council, Mr. Khare and representatives of participating contributing countries had an exchange of views.”

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
4 June 2010

Original: English

Official communiqué of the 6332nd (closed) meeting of the Security Council

**Held in private at Headquarters, New York, on Friday,
4 June 2010, at 11.30 a.m.**

In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General in place of a verbatim record:

"On 4 June 2010, the Security Council, pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B, held its 6332nd meeting in private with the police- and military liaison officer-contributing countries to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste.

"The Security Council and the police- and military liaison officer-contributing countries heard briefings under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure by Mr. Atul Khare, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and Mr. Ata Yenigun of the Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

"Members of the Council, Mr. Khare and representatives of participating contributing countries had an exchange of views."





Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6333rd meeting

Monday, 7 June 2010, 10 a.m.

New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Heller	(Mexico)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Ebner
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbalic
	Brazil	Mr. Moretti
	China	Mr. Zhang Junan
	France	Mr. Bonne
	Gabon	Mr. Mounagara Moussotsi
	Japan	Mr. Takasu
	Lebanon	Mr. Ziadeh
	Nigeria	Mr. Onemola
	Russian Federation	Mr. Sitnikov
	Turkey	Mr. Çorman
	Uganda	Mr. Rugunda
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Shepherd
	United States of America	Mr. DeLaurentis

Agenda

Non-proliferation Democratic People's Republic of Korea

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10-39110 (E)



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The meeting was called to order at 10 05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2010/285, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the United States of America and Japan.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1928 (2010).

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 10.10 a.m.



Security Council

Distr.: General
8 June 2010

Original: English

Official communiqué of the 6334th (closed) meeting of the Security Council

**Held in private at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday,
8 June 2010, at 3 p.m.**

In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General in place of a verbatim record:

"At its 6334th meeting, held in private on 8 June 2010, the Security Council considered the item entitled 'Non-proliferation'.

"The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of those countries, who had so requested, to participate in the consideration without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

"The members of the Council had an exchange of views."





Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6335th meeting

Wednesday, 9 June 2010, 10 a.m.

New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Heller	(Mexico)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Mayr-Harting
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbačić
	Brazil	Mrs. Viotti
	China	Mr. Li Baodong
	France	Mr. Araud
	Gabon	Mr. Issoze-Ngondet
	Japan	Mr. Takasu
	Lebanon	Mr. Salam
	Nigeria	Mr. Onemola
	Russian Federation	Mr. Churkin
	Turkey	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda	Mr. Rugunda
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . .	Sir Mark Lyall Grant
	United States of America	Ms. Rice

Agenda

Non-proliferation

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The meeting was called to order at 11.15 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Non-proliferation

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran, in which they request to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the consideration of the item, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Khazaei (Islamic Republic of Iran) and Mr. Wittig (Germany) took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2010/283, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by France, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall now give the floor to members of the Council wishing to make statements before the voting.

Mrs. Viotti (Brazil): Brazil will vote against the draft resolution. In doing so, we are honouring the purposes that inspired us in the efforts that resulted in the Tehran declaration of 17 May. We will do so because we do not see sanctions as an effective

instrument in this case. Sanctions will most probably lead to the suffering of the people of Iran and will play into the hands of those on all sides who do not want dialogue to prevail. Past experiences in the United Nations, notably the case of Iraq, show that the spiral of sanctions, threats and isolation can result in tragic consequences.

We will vote against the draft resolution also because the adoption of sanctions at this juncture runs counter to the successful efforts of Brazil and Turkey to engage Iran in a negotiated solution with regard to its nuclear programme.

As Brazil has stated repeatedly, the Tehran declaration adopted on 17 May is a unique opportunity that should not be missed. It was approved by the highest levels of the Iranian leadership and endorsed by Iran's parliament. The Tehran declaration promoted a solution that would ensure the full exercise of Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy while providing full, verifiable assurances that Iran's nuclear programme has exclusively peaceful purposes. We are firmly convinced that the only possible way to achieve this collective goal is to secure Iran's cooperation through effective and action-oriented dialogue and negotiations.

The Tehran declaration showed that dialogue and persuasion can do more than punitive action. Its purpose and result were to build the confidence needed to address the whole set of aspects of Iran's nuclear programme. As we explained yesterday, the joint declaration removed political obstacles to the materialization of a proposal by the International Atomic Energy Agency in October 2009. Many Governments and highly respected institutions and individuals have come to acknowledge its value as an important step to a broader discussion on the Iranian nuclear programme.

The Brazilian Government deeply regrets, therefore, that the joint declaration has neither received the political recognition it deserves nor been given the time it needs to bear fruit. Brazil considers it unnatural to rush to sanctions before the parties concerned can sit and talk about the implementation of the declaration. The Vienna Group's replies to the Iranian letter of 24 May, which confirmed Iran's commitment to the content of the declaration, were received just hours ago. No time has been given for Iran to react to the

opinions of the Vienna Group, including to the proposal of a technical meeting to address details.

The adoption of sanctions in such circumstances sends the wrong signal to what could be the beginning of a constructive engagement in Vienna. Also of great concern was the way in which the permanent members, together with a country that is not a member of the Security Council, negotiated among themselves for months behind closed doors.

Brazil attaches the utmost importance to disarmament and non-proliferation, and our record in this domain is impeccable. We have also affirmed, and reaffirm now, the imperative for all nuclear activity to be conducted under the applicable safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Iran's activities are no exception. We continue to believe that the Tehran declaration is sound policy and should be pursued. We hope that all parties involved will see the long-term wisdom of doing so.

In our view, the adoption of new sanctions by the Security Council will delay rather than accelerate or ensure progress in addressing the question. We should not miss the opportunity to start a process that can lead to a peaceful, negotiated solution to this question. The concerns regarding Iran's nuclear programme raised today will not be resolved until dialogue begins. By adopting sanctions, this Council is actually opting for one of the two tracks that were supposed to run in parallel — in our opinion, the wrong one.

Mr. Apakan (Turkey): Turkey is fully committed to its responsibilities in the field of non-proliferation, and as such is a party to all major international non-proliferation instruments and regimes. We do not want any country in our region to possess nuclear weapons. Such a development would make even more difficult the attainment of the goal of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, to which Turkey attaches great importance.

Turkey would like to see the restoration of confidence within the international community concerning the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. To that end, we see no viable alternative to a diplomatic and peaceful solution. It is in that understanding that, together with Brazil, we signed the Tehran declaration, which aims to implement the swap formula elaborated by the International Atomic Energy Agency in October last

year with a view to providing nuclear fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor.

The Tehran declaration has created a new reality with respect to Iran's nuclear programme. The declaration, which was designed as a confidence-building measure, would, if implemented, contribute to the resolution of the substantive issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme in a positive and constructive atmosphere. The declaration in essence provides a first step in a broader road map that could lead to a comprehensive settlement of the problem. In other words, the Tehran declaration provides a new and important window of opportunity for diplomacy. Sufficient time and space should be allowed for its implementation. We are deeply concerned that the adoption of sanctions would negatively affect the momentum created by the declaration and the overall diplomatic process.

On the other hand, it was rather unhelpful that the response of the Vienna Group was received only a few hours ago. The fact that the response was of a negative nature and that it was sent on the day of the adoption of the draft resolution on sanctions had a determining effect on our position. Our position demonstrates our commitment to the Tehran declaration and to diplomatic efforts.

That said, our vote against the draft resolution today should not be construed as reflecting indifference to the problems emanating from Iran's nuclear programme. There are serious questions within the international community regarding the purpose and nature of Iran's nuclear programme, and those need to be clarified. We take this opportunity to call upon Iran to show absolute transparency about its nuclear programme and to demonstrate full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to restore confidence.

Turkey attaches great importance to the resolution of this problem through peaceful means and negotiations. The draft resolution on sanctions will be adopted today despite our active and unrelenting efforts in that direction. However, the adoption of the draft resolution should not be seen as representing an end to diplomatic efforts. We are of the firm opinion that, after the adoption of the draft resolution, efforts to find a peaceful solution to this problem will have to be continued even more resolutely.

On the other hand, we take note of the concerns of the international community regarding the uranium enriched by Iran at 20 per cent. We expect the Iranian authorities to take steps to dispel the concerns of the international community, which reflect certain question marks regarding the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. We now expect Iran to work towards the implementation of the Tehran declaration. The declaration must stay on the table. Iran should come to the negotiating table with the permanent five members of the Security Council plus Germany to take up its nuclear programme, including the suspension of enrichment. We will contribute to that process.

With those considerations, the Republic of Turkey shall thus vote against the draft resolution today.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): The Council will now proceed to take a decision on the draft resolution (S/2010/283) before it.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, France, Gabon, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Against:

Brazil, Turkey

Abstaining:

Lebanon

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): The result of the voting is as follows: 12 votes in favour, 2 against and 1 abstention. The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 1929 (2010).

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the voting.

Ms. Rice (United States of America): Today, the Security Council has responded decisively to the grave threat to international peace and security posed by Iran's failure to live up to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Treaty is the principal international legal instrument for holding Member States accountable, discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons, and bringing the benefits of nuclear energy to all corners of the world. As President Obama has said, rules must be

binding; violations must be punished; words must mean something.

The issue is straightforward. We are at this point because the Government of Iran has chosen clearly and wilfully to violate its commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the resolutions of this Council. Despite consistent and long-standing demands by the international community, Iran has not suspended its uranium enrichment and other proliferation-related activities. The Security Council has passed a resolution today aimed at reinforcing the need for Iran to take these steps and comply with its obligations. These sanctions are not directed at the Iranian people, nor do they seek to stop Iran from the legitimate exercise of its rights under the NPT, in conformity with its obligations. Rather, the sanctions aim squarely at the nuclear ambitions of a Government that has chosen a path that will lead to increased isolation.

These sanctions are as tough as they are smart and precise. The resolution prohibits Iran from investing in sensitive nuclear activities abroad. It imposes binding new restrictions on Iran's import of conventional arms. It bans all Iranian activities related to ballistic missiles that could deliver a nuclear weapon. It imposes a comprehensive framework of cargo inspections to detect and stop Iran's smuggling and acquisition of illicit materials or nuclear items.

It creates important new tools to block Iran's use of the international financial system, particularly Iranian banks, to fund and facilitate nuclear proliferation. It highlights the potential links between Iran's energy sector and its nuclear ambitions. It targets the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran's proliferation efforts. It establishes a United Nations panel of experts to help monitor and enforce the implementation of sanctions. And it imposes targeted new sanctions, including asset freezes and travel bans, on 40 entities and an individual linked to Iranian nuclear proliferation.

Since 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency has sought to investigate serious concerns that Iran's nuclear programme might have military dimensions. In 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors expressed "grave concern" that Iran had still not enabled the IAEA to assure Member States that Iran had declared all of its nuclear material and activities. For our part, the United States launched a sustained

and serious effort, starting early last year, to engage with Iran on a range of issues of mutual concern, including these nuclear issues. The United States has made detailed and specific openings to the Iranians, including personal and direct outreach by President Obama.

The United States strongly supports the peaceful use of the atom for energy and innovation. Like every nation, Iran has rights; but it also has responsibilities, and the two are inextricably linked. Iran has shunned opportunity after opportunity to allow verification of the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. In recent months, Iran has given us all more reason, not less, to suspect that its goal is to develop the ability to assemble a nuclear weapon. Last September, the world learned that Iran had secretly built another uranium enrichment facility at Qom, in clear violation of Security Council resolutions and Iran's IAEA obligations. Last November, Iran announced that it would build 10 more such facilities. In February, Iran said that it would begin to enrich uranium to nearly 20 per cent, moving closer to weapons-grade material. In May, the IAEA affirmed yet again that Iran is continuing its banned uranium enrichment, and warned that Iran has amassed more than 2,400 kilograms of low-enriched uranium.

The resolution we adopted today offers Iran a clear path towards the immediate suspension of these sanctions. The best way is also the easiest one. Iran must fulfil its international obligations, suspend its enrichment-related reprocessing and heavy-water-related activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA. The United States reaffirms our commitment to engage in robust, principled and creative diplomacy. We will remain ready to continue diplomacy with Iran and its leaders in order to make clear how much they have to gain from acting responsibly and how much more they stand to lose from continued recklessness. Today's resolution does not replace those efforts, but it does support them.

Turkey and Brazil have worked hard to make progress on the Tehran Research Reactor proposal, efforts that reflect their leaders' good intentions to address the Iranian people's humanitarian needs while building more international confidence about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. My Government will continue to discuss the Iranian revised proposal and our concerns about it, as appropriate.

But the Tehran Research Reactor proposal, then and now, does not respond to the fundamental, well-founded and unanswered concerns about Iran's nuclear programme. Today's resolution does. Until the world's concerns with Iran's nuclear defiance are fully resolved, we must work together to ensure that the sanctions in the resolution are fully and firmly implemented. We must ensure that the development of the most devastating weapons ever devised by human science is prescribed by the most responsible controls ever produced by human Government. Last month, 189 countries came together to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty as a cornerstone of global security. Today's resolution is an important part of that work. The NPT must remain at the centre of our global effort to stop nuclear proliferation, even as we pursue the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

Today, I am proud to say that this Council has risen to its responsibilities. Now Iran should choose a wiser course.

Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom): I would like to begin by reading out the text of a statement that has been agreed on by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the High Representative of the European Union. The statement reads as follows:

"We, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm our determination and commitment to seek an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

"The adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1929 (2010), while reflecting the international community's concern about the Iranian nuclear programme and reconfirming the need for Iran to comply with the United Nations Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors requirements, keeps the door open for continued engagement between the E3+3 and Iran. The aim of our efforts is to achieve a comprehensive and long-term settlement which would restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, while respecting Iran's legitimate rights to the peaceful use of atomic energy. We are resolute in continuing our work for this purpose. We also welcome and commend

all diplomatic efforts in this regard, especially those recently made by Brazil and Turkey on the specific issue of the Tehran Research Reactor.

"We reaffirm our June 2008 proposals, which remain valid, as confirmed by resolution 1929 (2010). We believe these proposals provide a sound basis for future negotiations. We are prepared to continue dialogue and interaction with Iran in the context of implementing the understandings reached during the Geneva meeting of 1 October 2009. We have asked Baroness Ashton, the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to pursue this with Mr. Saheed Jalili, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, at the earliest opportunity.

"We expect Iran to demonstrate a pragmatic attitude and to respond positively to our openness towards dialogue and negotiations."

That concludes the statement on behalf of the six Foreign Ministers.

I should now like to make some remarks in my national capacity.

Today, the Security Council adopted resolution 1929 (2010) as a result of the international community's ongoing serious concerns about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear programme. Once again, the Security Council has sent a strong message of international resolve. It is a clear signal that Iran's continued failure to comply with its Security Council and IAEA Board requirements to cease its enrichment-related activities cannot be tolerated.

The Security Council last addressed this issue in September 2008 in a clear statement that we wish to resolve our serious concerns through dialogue and negotiation (see S/PV.5984). Since that time, we have made several efforts to achieve that. When E3+3 Foreign Ministers met in New York on 23 September 2009 they reiterated their wish to negotiate a comprehensive long-term agreement to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. But they also made clear that this could only be achieved if both sides were willing to approach these matters in a spirit of mutual respect and were committed to looking for solutions going forward.

At last October's meeting in Geneva we reached agreement on three important issues. First, Iran agreed to hold a further meeting on its nuclear programme

within one month. Iran also said that it would cooperate fully and immediately with the IAEA on the enrichment facility near Qom. It also agreed in principle to a deal to resupply its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).

We welcomed those commitments and made clear that we hoped that it would be the start of a period of intense negotiation. We regret that that did not prove to be the case. Iran has stated repeatedly that it will not discuss its nuclear programme, claiming that our concerns are baseless. They are not. They are fully documented in reports from the IAEA Director General going back several years and the subject of Security Council resolutions since 2006. The purpose of the facility at Qom remains unestablished. The February 2010 IAEA report made clear once again that Iran had not answered a number of key questions.

On the TRR, three days of talks in Vienna produced a detailed proposal from the IAEA that all parties present agreed. Iran then withdrew its initial acceptance of the TRR proposal and in February started to enrich low-enriched uranium to 20 per cent, despite having neither the need to do so nor the means to fabricate the fuel for use in the reactor. Iran also announced the construction of further enrichment facilities.

We acknowledge the good-faith efforts of Turkey and Brazil to persuade Iran to engage with the IAEA on the Tehran Research Reactor. However, we cannot accept Iran's attempts to use these efforts to justify its continued defiance of successive Security Council resolutions that mandate a suspension of Iran's enrichment operations. We have said many times that we do not question Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy. But with those rights come responsibilities.

Today's resolution has been made necessary by Iran's actions. Once again, the resolution restates our willingness to engage in dialogue to address the substance of our concerns. The measures adopted in this and previous resolutions can be suspended when Iran suspends its proscribed activities.

We remain ready to resume the talks on Iran's nuclear programme that we started in Geneva on 1 October 2009. We believe that such talks can lead to a solution as long as they are purposeful, discuss both sides' concerns and make swift progress. In extending our hand, we show our determination to resolve these matters through dialogue and diplomacy, and in

adopting this resolution we show equal determination to continue to respond robustly to Iran's refusal to comply with its international obligations.

Mr. Araud (France) (*spoke in French*): France welcomes the adoption of resolution 1929 (2010). The Council adopted it by a large majority, with the votes of countries of Africa, Asia, Europe and America, countries with or without a nuclear industry and countries with or without trade relations with Iran.

This unity has a clear reason, and all members know it. For 18 years, Iran has been developing a clandestine nuclear programme. Once that programme was discovered, Iran has unceasingly impeded the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to uncover its objective. Iran continues to enrich uranium despite five Security Council resolutions and the lack of a credible nuclear power programme on its soil.

The facts are overwhelming; there is no room for doubt. It is sufficient to recall them. Iran has developed a programme for missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Iran has worked on advanced military studies that are the missing link between enrichment and the ballistic missile programme, in particular on building a delivery vehicle in which a nuclear warhead can be placed, while rejecting all cooperation on that issue with the Agency.

More recently, Iran has built a clandestine enrichment facility at Qom, adapted to military use but far too small for civilian use. That facility would have to function 24 hours a day for 45 years to provide fuel for a civilian reactor. Finally, in February Iran started to enrich its uranium to 20 per cent, which brings it even closer to a military threshold.

It is no surprise, therefore, that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has concluded in its Director General's report of 31 May that it was impossible for it to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.

This, however, was not for lack of increased efforts to lead Iran, through dialogue, to prove its openness. Since 2003, the three European States — the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and France — have been seeking to start a dialogue with Iran. That approach resulted in the first European cooperation proposal of August 2005, then the E3+3 proposal of 2006 and a new proposal of June 2008.

Significant incentives have been offered to Iran in the nuclear, security, commercial, agricultural and medical fields. A high-level delegation went to Tehran in June 2008 with a letter signed by the six Ministers, including the United States Secretary of State of that time. Countless meetings, ministerial exchanges and direct, indirect, multilateral and bilateral contacts took place with the Iranians. No effort was spared. However, those offers did not succeed, owing to the refusal of the Iranians to start negotiations, and for seven months Iran has refused to meet the European Union representative, Baroness Ashton, despite the commitment that it undertook last October.

In that context, my country gratefully welcomes the initiative of Turkey and Brazil on the Tehran Research Reactor as a confidence-building measure, and French authorities have indicated this at the highest level. We welcome the commitment of the two eminent leaders and wish them success. However, we note that Iran has already spared no effort to strip the agreement of its substance by continuing to enrich its uranium to 20 per cent and reaffirming its intention to continue to do so, which negates the main purpose of the agreement, and by playing for time to ensure that it would have to export only a fraction of its stockpile of uranium to enable it to rapidly rebuild the necessary quantity for a military device.

We have also noted Iran's biased reading of the agreement, choosing to view it as a justification for unlimited enrichment, a definitive rejection of sanctions and IAEA inspections, and an alibi to avoid discussing its nuclear programme with the E3+3.

Finally and most importantly, a satisfactory agreement on the Tehran Research Reactor, which we sincerely hope to achieve, could be a useful confidence-building measure although it would not address the heart of the problem. The heart of the problem is the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, the discovery of the clandestine facility in Qom, enrichment to 20 per cent and Iran's obstruction of the IAEA's efforts. This problem remains unchanged, and Iran's refusal to resolve it forces us to be firm today.

For these reasons, the sanctions resolution that we have just adopted is an appropriate response. The resolution is robust, yet specific and targeted. It is not aimed at the Iranian people. Its measures will increase the cost to Iran of its proliferation policy. They will

slow down the progress of the nuclear programme and thereby give us more time for diplomacy. In fact, it was the very least we could do following the discovery of the clandestine facility in Qom and the beginning of enrichment to 20 per cent. It is our duty to protect the non-proliferation Treaty — a vessel that Iran believes it can board without a ticket.

If we did not react to such developments, the message we would send to potential followers of Iran would be: Go ahead. It is also our duty to prevent a regional arms race, which could be provoked by mere doubt concerning the aims of the Iranian programme. It is our duty, finally, to prevent a conflict leading to disastrous consequences in an unstable region.

That being said, the door of dialogue remains open. This includes discussions on the Tehran Research Reactor. Fully mindful of Brazil and Turkey's efforts, France, the United States and Russia have written to the IAEA Director General to share with him the problematic issues raised by the Tehran agreement. We will propose an experts meeting with Iran as soon as possible to reach agreement on these issues. We are also ready to consider other confidence-building measures, as spelled out in the resolution that we have just adopted.

However, this is a decision that we cannot take alone. It is now up to Iranian leaders to take the hand offered to them, as we have urged them to do for nearly seven years. It is up to them to consider the interests of their people, rather than to pursue a dangerous dream of power at the cost of regional stability. It is up to them to choose integration into international society, reaping its dividends rather than the growing isolation to which they are condemning themselves. If they are ready for this, we will be there to help them.

Mr. Rugunda (Uganda): Uganda voted in favour of resolution 1929 (2010) because we fully support the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The resolution has a mechanism for review, including the suspension and removal of the measures imposed, provided that Iran complies with its obligations and the NPT. It is important that all nuclear activities of State parties to the NPT be verified for their compliance with the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Agency has raised a number of issues in its reports regarding the Iranian nuclear programme that require clarification by Iran so as to assure the

international community that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes. Uganda commends and supports the diplomatic efforts of Brazil and Turkey that resulted in the Tehran declaration. We are convinced that such confidence-building initiatives are useful in the search for a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

Uganda reiterates that it is important to continue all efforts towards a negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's inalienable right to develop its nuclear energy, while at the same time assuring the international community that its programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Russia voted in favour of resolution 1929 (2010) on the basis of its consistent principled position regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. We have consistently advocated a resolution of all the international community's questions concerning Iran's nuclear programme through dialogue and constructive cooperation with Tehran.

We hope that Iran will view the resolution as a further signal of the need to respond positively to the numerous appeals of the E3+3 and the entire international community to fulfil its non-proliferation obligations and to launch substantial negotiations with the E3+3 to ensure full and transparent cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to clarify all issues related to the Iranian nuclear programme.

Russia has made and will continue to make significant multilateral and independent efforts to convince Iran to cooperate constructively with the E3+3 and to fulfil in good faith all provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions and IAEA decisions. In building the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Russia is reaffirming not just in words but in actions the fundamental right of Iran, as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to develop a peaceful nuclear energy programme. Unfortunately, the intensive efforts of Russia and our partners in the E3+3 have yet to receive an appropriate response from Iran. Tehran has yet to take the decisions necessary to pave the way to its full enjoyment of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Under these conditions and in the context of the dual-path approach developed by the E3+3 and

approved by the Security Council, it has become inevitable that additional restrictive measures should be adopted to constrain development in those Iranian activities that run counter to the task of strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

The Security Council's adoption of sanctions is a forced step, and we approach their use in a balanced and proportional way. During the negotiation of the resolution, Russian delegation's efforts were targeted at ensuring that the Council's decision aimed exclusively at bolstering the non-proliferation regime and contained no provision that would harm the well-being of the Iranian people.

We are firmly convinced that there is no alternative to a peaceful, diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. This postulate was reflected in the text of the resolution. We expect that Tehran will ultimately signal its full readiness to engage in negotiations with the E3+3. In the framework of such dialogue, the critical discussion of the Iranian nuclear programme would also address the E3+3's proposed package of constructive incentives for our Iranian partners, in cooperation with the IAEA, to remove any lingering doubts about the programme. This package remains on the table, as reaffirmed by the resolution just adopted and the statement of the E3+3 Foreign Ministers at today's meeting.

We are convinced that the contents of the package fully demonstrate the benefits to Iran of cooperation with the international community in various fields, which is impossible in the context of its disregard for Security Council resolutions and IAEA decisions on its nuclear programme. We hope that Iran will see these clear benefits and initiate cooperation with the E3+3, including in implementing all the understandings reached in Geneva on 1 October 2009. Clarifying the nature of Iran's nuclear programme through Tehran's full and transparent cooperation with the IAEA could reverse the Security Council's sanctions against the country and afford it the opportunity to fully exercise all the rights enjoyed by non-nuclear parties to the NPT, including to uranium enrichment for nuclear power plant fuel production.

We hope that the fuel-swap mechanism for the Tehran Research Reactor, which Russia originated, will be implemented. We welcome Brazil and Turkey's efforts in that regard. Relevant work related to this

initiative is continuing within the framework of the Vienna Group, with our active participation.

In conclusion, I should like again to underscore that we expect that Iran will act in a pragmatic and reasonable manner and respond positively to the six facilitators' openness to dialogue to effectively resolve the Iranian nuclear issue in the interest of the entire international community.

Mr. Takasu (Japan): Japan voted in favour of resolution 1929 (2010). I would like to explain the reasons for Japan's support for this important resolution.

The Iranian nuclear issue has been a source of serious concern to the international community since Iran's extensive nuclear activities were revealed in 2002. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Security Council have been closely engaged and taken a series of decisions to resolve this issue of international concern. As a country strongly committed to the regime of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Japan upholds the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It should be stressed, however, that the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy entails the responsibility to comply with requirements and obligations under the relevant IAEA and Security Council resolutions. The Council needs to squarely address the fact that Iran continues to violate its resolutions and fails to meet IAEA requirements.

The Tehran declaration on the exchange of Iranian low-enriched uranium and nuclear fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor would be a positive step if it were properly implemented. We pay tribute to the efforts of Brazil and Turkey to contribute to a diplomatic solution. However, this accord does not address the core issue of Iran's obligations under Security Council resolutions. That is to say that Iran is obliged to suspend all enrichment-related activities until it fully satisfies and clarifies the international community's concerns about the nuclear programme and thereby restores confidence. Even after the Tehran declaration, Iran continues to enrich and accumulate more low-enriched uranium, including activities to enrich up to 20 per cent, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. The recent report of the IAEA Director General of 31 May once again states that Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to

permit the IAEA to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is for peaceful activities.

Japan supports the dual-track approach taken by the E3+3 group — and endorsed by the Security Council — to solve the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and the necessary pressure, since resolution 1929 (2010) contains a firm but targeted and balanced message urging Iran to change its policy. Iran should intensify its cooperation with the IAEA to fully clarify outstanding and new issues in order to prove that its extensive nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes. Iran should also faithfully implement the decisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1929 (2010), so as to restore international trust and confidence.

Resolution 1929 (2010) is in line with the dual-track approach. In no way does it mean closing doors to continuing efforts to achieve diplomatic solutions through dialogue with Iran. I would like to underscore that the window for diplomatic efforts is open. Such thinking is well reflected in resolution 1929 (2010). On its part, Japan continues to seize every opportunity to urge Iran to take the strategic decision to seek a constructive solution to the nuclear issue.

Mr. Mayr-Harting (Austria): Austria voted in favour of resolution 1929 (2010). A decision of this kind is never one to be taken lightly. From the time that Iran's undeclared nuclear materials and activities were first confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in June 2003, Austria had hoped that the matter could be resolved through negotiation. Insufficient cooperation on the part of Iran led to the transmission of the issue to the Security Council in March 2006. Since that time, the Council has adopted a presidential statement and five resolutions. Regrettably, Iran has failed to address the core concerns of the international community and to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

Indeed, since the adoption of the last Council resolution in September 2008, the existence of a new undeclared enrichment facility has come to light and Iran has begun to enrich uranium to 20 per cent, to mention but two of the more recent developments. This is all the more unfortunate as last month the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) here in New York demonstrated a new constructive approach to non-proliferation issues. In the action plans adopted

on that occasion, all NPT member States underscored, *inter alia*, the importance of cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency on questions of compliance.

As I indicated yesterday, Austria, in line with long-standing European Union policy, remains committed to the dual-track approach. In that context, we reiterate our call on Iran to take up the offer of talks with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in line with paragraph 33 of the resolution just adopted.

While we believe that the additional measures adopted today are necessary, we continue to stand behind the two major incentive packages put forward in June 2006 and June 2008. We hope that Iran will take up the offer of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the High Representative of the European Union, to resume dialogue on the nuclear issue without preconditions, with a view to seeking a comprehensive solution to this issue. In that context, I wish to highlight in particular the commitment contained in paragraph 37 of today's resolution to suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome.

Mr. Li Baodong (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The Security Council has just adopted a new resolution on the Iranian nuclear issue. This is the sixth resolution adopted by the Council on the matter since July 2006. Like the previous five, the new resolution not only reflects the concerns of the international community about the Iranian nuclear issue, but also expresses the aspiration of all parties to achieve an early and peaceful settlement of the issue through diplomatic negotiations. China calls on all members of the international community to implement the resolution comprehensively and in good faith. China has consistently maintained that the actions taken by the Security Council on the Iranian nuclear issue must adhere to the following three principles.

First, it should contribute to the maintenance of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. As a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran should strictly fulfil its

obligations under the Treaty. In the meantime, its right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be fully respected and safeguarded. Secondly, the Security Council's actions should be conducive to peace and stability in the Middle East, especially the Gulf region. Thirdly, it should help to promote the current momentum towards global economic recovery and not affect the day-to-day lives of the Iranian people or normal international trade and transactions.

The action taken by the Security Council should be appropriate, incremental, clearly targeted and commensurate with the actual practices of Iran in the nuclear field. It should reinforce diplomatic efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue.

China was earnestly and constructively engaged in the consultations on the draft resolution and worked vigorously to ensure that the text fully reflected the foregoing principles.

We are of the view that sanctions can never fundamentally resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. To bring about a comprehensive and appropriate settlement of the issue, it is imperative to return to the track of dialogue and negotiation. The Security Council's adoption of this new resolution does not mean that the door to diplomatic efforts is closed. The new resolution is aimed at bringing Iran back to the negotiating table and at activating a new round of diplomatic efforts.

To that end, the sanctions mentioned in the new resolution are reversible. In other words, if Iran suspends uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities and complies with the relevant resolutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Security Council, the Council will suspend or even lift its sanctions against Iran.

It has always been China's view that Security Council unity is essential to resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. We have always maintained that the importance of the unity of the Security Council, and we are not in favour of hasty action. We believe that we must make a greater effort to maintain the unity of the Security Council.

Over the years, China has been committed to peacefully resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic negotiations and has made unremitting efforts in that regard. China welcomes and highly values the tripartite agreement between Brazil, Turkey

and Iran on nuclear fuel exchange for the Tehran Research Reactor. We hope the parties concerned will make full use of the positive momentum created by the agreement and will spare no effort to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue peacefully through dialogue and negotiations.

As the Security Council adopted its new resolution on the Iranian nuclear issue, the E3+3 Foreign Ministers issued a joint statement reiterating their commitment to resolving the issue through diplomatic negotiations and expressing their readiness to redouble diplomatic efforts towards the resumption of negotiations. China hopes that the countries concerned will, on the basis of equality and mutual respect, strengthen contacts and dialogue, foster mutual trust, dispel misgivings, address one another's concerns and seek a solution acceptable to all parties to restart negotiations.

China will work along with all countries concerned and continue to make its own contribution to the peaceful settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic means.

Mr. Salam (Lebanon) (*spoke in Arabic*): Lebanon was among the first countries to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is therefore important for Lebanon to reaffirm that the Treaty is extremely important in terms of the balance among and interdependence of its three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. For both Lebanon and the Arab States in general, the Treaty is the cornerstone of our response to the expectation of our peoples for a world free of nuclear weapons.

On behalf of the Arab Group, Lebanon reaffirmed this principle during last month's NPT Review Conference in New York. There, the need to attain the universality of the Treaty was included among the core priorities of the international community. In line with our endeavour to attain the noble objective of freeing the entire world of nuclear weapons, our Arab peoples dream of the day when the people of the Middle East can enjoy living in a region free of nuclear weapons, as is the case with other regions and other peoples of the world.

In this regard, we stress the importance of the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which reaffirms the call to transform the Middle East into a zone free of nuclear weapons on the basis of the

decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and to develop a mechanism for its implementation.

Israel is the only country in our region that possesses nuclear weapons. Israel should adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear State and subject all of its nuclear facilities to the comprehensive safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

It is very important for Lebanon to say that the approach to non-proliferation issues should be comprehensive and non-selective. However, a focus on nuclear non-proliferation should not overshadow the need to reaffirm the inherent and inalienable right of all States parties to the NPT, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the rules and criteria established by the International Atomic Energy Agency as well as its comprehensive safeguards regime.

Thus, Lebanon believes that the understanding reflected in the Tehran declaration on enriched uranium — reached in May at the excellent initiative of Brazil and Turkey — is a significant step towards a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. My delegation has reaffirmed several times before the Council that the Tehran understanding provides an important opportunity that we should all seize and deal with in a positive manner.

Although that understanding did not have the necessary support and was not given enough time to yield the expected results, its elements still provide a gateway for the required process of confidence building. Even if the understanding does not dispel the doubts and respond to the questions of many Council members, the most effective response to any concerns or questions about the Iranian nuclear issue will come through further dialogue, not through sanctions. That is Lebanon's firm and well-known position of principle.

My Government has studied the issue of today's vote, and we have not at this time reached a final position. For that reason, Lebanon abstained. However, Lebanon believes, on the basis of its unwavering positions, which I have just recalled, that today's new sanctions resolution is a sad setback for diplomatic efforts.

We refuse to give up in the face of this situation, and we call on all States, despite all the difficulties of this situation, to immediately resume and intensify

international efforts, especially those of the E3+3. We appreciate all the efforts made by the E3+3 in recent years to reach, through responsible dialogue and due flexibility, a solution to all pending issues with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme on the basis of mutual respect, constructive cooperation and the right of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, to have access to nuclear energy and to develop the relevant technologies in accordance with the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement.

Mr. Onemola (Nigeria): Our vote this morning was informed by respect for our unwavering commitment to the ideals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Adherence to the NPT does not preclude any country from optimizing its full use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; rather, it guarantees the inalienable right of parties to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The NPT also remains the best framework for achieving disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indeed, Nigeria is pursuing a peaceful nuclear programme within the parameters of the NPT, including its safeguards agreement and additional protocol, in full cooperation and collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thus, we recognize Iran's right to pursue a peaceful nuclear programme.

Where, however, questions arise and evidence suggests that a country's nuclear programme and activities are inconsistent with the provisions of the NPT, it becomes a matter of great concern to us. Having followed very carefully the discussions on Iran's nuclear activities, Nigeria, like other countries, has been unable to fully understand whether Iran's nuclear programme is entirely and strictly for peaceful purposes. Therefore, it is incumbent on Iran to dispel the doubts that surround its nuclear activities. Specifically, we are convinced that Iran, as a State party to the NPT, has clearly violated its obligations under the Treaty. Furthermore, Nigeria does not understand Iran's failure to cooperate with the IAEA. We are also troubled by Iran's failure to fully implement its safeguards agreement, including the additional protocol.

These worrisome failures have been compounded by the lack of clarity on the sudden spike in the building of nuclear sites, some of which were shrouded in secrecy. Moreover, the decision by Iran to enrich uranium to a higher level of 20 per cent and its

insistence on continuing its enrichment programme raise genuine doubt about the real direction of its nuclear activities.

Notwithstanding our misgivings, we believe that a dual-track approach that combines pressure with intense political and diplomatic activities is the best way to resolve the Iranian nuclear conundrum. We are satisfied that the resolution that we have just adopted recognizes this and commits all countries to pursue a dual-track approach regarding Iran. We welcome the explicit reaffirmation that outstanding issues can best be resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme by Iran responding positively to all the calls that the Council and the IAEA Board of Governors have made on Iran.

The emphasis on the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes gives hope that all the doors are not closed on Iran. In that regard, we applaud Brazil and Turkey for their exemplary initiative in signing with Iran at the highest political levels the joint Tehran declaration of 17 May 2010. We hope that it will still be possible to follow through on the joint declaration as a concrete confidence-building measure. Cooperation with the IAEA and the resumption of early dialogue with Baroness Ashton will give further impetus to a political settlement of the dispute.

Finally, I would like to echo the accent placed in the resolution on the fact that nothing compels States to take measures or actions exceeding the scope of the resolution, including the use of force or the threat of use of force in responding to Iran. Satisfied with the intent of the resolution and the recognition of the need for continued political and diplomatic efforts, Nigeria voted in favour of resolution 1929 (2010).

Mr. Barbačić (Bosnia and Herzegovina): I would like to stress once again that Bosnia and Herzegovina was among those who nourished the hope that the issue at stake could be resolved through negotiations and in a manner that would satisfy the concerns of all. However, we find ourselves confronted with further aggravation regarding a comprehensive solution to the issue of nuclear capacity development in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Bosnia

and Herzegovina is fully committed to implementing the Treaty, which represents a unique and irreplaceable framework for the promotion of security and the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. It is our strong belief that only full implementation of NPT safeguards agreements can ensure that nuclear energy is used in a safe and responsible manner. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the implementing agency remains the most reliable instrument to verify compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Furthermore, we consider that the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy by all States is also important and must be fully respected and protected. Iran is no exception to that rule. It should be made clear, nevertheless, that the scope and objectives of any nuclear programme, including the Iranian programme, have to remain in accordance with the international rules and must be subjected to the verifiable and transparent inspection regime of the IAEA.

The Security Council has adopted resolutions calling on Iran to comply with the provisions of the NPT and to extend its full cooperation to IAEA inspections. However, according to the most recent reports, the international community did not get a clear and unequivocal answer from Iran, which has put the Security Council in the position of looking for additional measures to address this issue of utmost importance.

Bearing in mind the importance of restoring confidence in the strictly peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, Bosnia and Herzegovina urges Iran to comply with all resolutions of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, and to implement the additional protocol. We firmly believe that a negotiated settlement, based on mutual trust and respect, is the best option. In that regard, we welcome the recent efforts by Turkey and Brazil as a significant confidence-building measure.

The resolution adopted today by the Security Council is tough. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina is of the view that the resolution does not close the way to further diplomatic efforts and an ultimate negotiated solution. We believe that additional efforts and support from various parties could contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to readdressing the current situation and finding a satisfactory negotiated solution, which is our ultimate goal.

Therefore, once again, we call upon the parties directly involved to explore all possible means that could pave the way to a peaceful solution of this issue of particular importance. Such an undertaking would be beneficial first and foremost for the people of Iran and would open new avenues for cooperation between Iran and the international community.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity.

Mexico is deeply committed to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy — the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We are concerned by any actions that could undermine the non-proliferation regime that the international community itself has adopted, particularly when they represent new threats to international peace and security in regions where tension, conflict and distrust among States prevail.

The case of Iran is not a new one for the Security Council, and unfortunately it is difficult to dissociate the debate on its controversial nuclear programme from its foreign policy pronouncements which run counter to the Charter of the United Nations and which give rise to concern and mistrust among a large portion of the international community.

The peaceful use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by a commitment — freely undertaken by each State — to respect the legal obligation not to carry out any activity related to a nuclear programme that has purposes other than peaceful ones. Iran must comply more transparently with the decisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), responding to all requests for information on its nuclear programme. And Iran must also comply with the resolutions of the Security Council, with an express and above all verifiable renunciation of the possession of nuclear weapons. The Iranian Government must make every effort to redress the shortfall of confidence that a large portion of the international community feels with respect to the lack of transparency in the development of Iran's nuclear programme. This would unquestionably contribute to dialogue and cooperation as a way of resolving disputes in the region. It is Iran, not the Security Council, that must earn the trust of the international community.

We reaffirm the importance of continuing to deal with the Iranian nuclear case through dialogue and the

importance of Iran continuing to cooperate with the IAEA to clarify pending questions about its nuclear programme in conformity with Security Council resolutions.

Today, we voted in favour of a resolution imposing sanctions on specific individuals and entities, sanctions that do not seek to harm the general population. These sanctions target nuclear proliferation activities and are completely reversible if the Government of Iran meets the requests of the Security Council. We urge the Government of Iran to meet those requests.

In our view, recent diplomatic initiatives on this matter are insufficient because they do not include a clear commitment to putting an end to nuclear-material enrichment activities and do not address the concerns of the international community. It is spurious to say that we are faced with an ultimatum or a dilemma between a peaceful solution and the use of force. In fact, after three rounds of sanctions, the path of dialogue with Iran remains open. A diplomatic solution is not incompatible with the adoption of sanctions, when the situation calls for it, and sanctions in no way close off dialogue and negotiation.

Mexico considers that the agreement we have reached is balanced. It puts greater pressure on Iran to fulfil its obligations under previous Security Council resolutions and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while leaving open the path by which Iran can return to the negotiating table and reach a diplomatic outcome if it meets its obligations under Council resolutions and the NPT.

In that context, Mexico is convinced that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as emphasized at this year's NPT Review Conference, should be part of a broader political understanding guaranteeing peaceful coexistence among the sovereign States of the region, including a future Palestinian State, and addressing the legitimate security concerns of those States.

In line with our pacifist outlook and our tradition of devotion to international law, we believe in the negotiated resolution of disputes. Mexico will continue to be committed to dialogue, peaceful means and the rejection of the use of force to resolve this issue.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

I now invite the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Khazaei (Islamic Republic of Iran): I have never seen this Chamber as crowded as I see it today, so I must welcome all my colleagues who are here to watch this debate. It reminds me of the football game between the United States and Iran at the World Cup in 1998: the whole world was watching it.

Before entering this Chamber, I was refreshing my memory of history. History is indeed a wonderful instructor, especially when it follows us to this very moment. A wise man used to say that it is not history that repeats itself; it is we who repeat the same mistakes. A review of our bitter past memories, together with a close look at how this Council still acts today, proves that we are still dealing with a biased and unjust international system that is based on the hegemony of the most powerful.

In order to place them on record for the conscience of all peace-loving people around the world, I would like to say a few words about the unfair pressures that our nation has endured due to the aggression and intervention of some of the same countries whose representatives are sitting around this table today and are pushing for the imposition of more pressure against the Iranian nation. Let me talk about our own historical experiences.

This is not, of course, accidental or spontaneous. Comparisons in this case are amazingly instructive. The case that members of the Security Council have considered today has characteristics that are identical to those of the case against my country in 1951. The key words are quite similar: energy, independence and big-Power intervention. In the early 1950s, the United Kingdom was arguing exactly the same way as today, saying that "nationalization of Iran's oil industry is putting in danger the peace and security of the region and the world". Just replace the phrase "oil nationalization" from accusations against Iran at that time with today's phrase "nuclear activities" and the result will be quite workable statements for diplomats who are repeating history.

It is worth remembering, however, that when Iran won the case regarding its oil nationalization in The Hague, the United Kingdom sold a trumped-up anti-communist story to President Eisenhower and a United States-led coup reinstated and supported the Shah's

dictatorship in Iran. Needless to say, the coup d'état was organized and implemented under the false pretext of maintaining international peace and security and respect for democracy and freedom — qualifications which were later used to justify many other, similar subversive actions against other developing nations in order to preserve or expand the interests of international cartels and consortia. The message was clear: No one should be allowed to endanger the vital interests of the capitalist world.

Yet again, history will not forget the stark similarity and sharp contrast that exist between the efforts to impose anti-Iranian sanctions at the present time and those of the 1950s against the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. The stark similarity is that the axis of the United Kingdom and United States has been, at both times, at work to deprive the Iranian nation of its absolute right to achieve self sufficiency in energy production, whether through hydrocarbons or peaceful nuclear energy.

The difference, however, is that the Islamic Republic of Iran today is more powerful than ever, supported by its people — who now have three decades of political experience, a scientific and industrial renaissance and a rich cultural heritage — and enjoys the support of the overwhelming majority of nations.

The hostile actions of these few Powers against our nation are not new. The United States and its allies even intervened on behalf of Saddam in his aggression against Iran, providing him with chemical weapons and other military support. That deadly support included increasing supplies of chemical and biological agents even after the first United Nations report was issued on the use of these lethal weapons by Saddam against civilian Kurds in northern Iraq and against Iranian troops. The first reaction of these Powers was to deny the accounts. The second reaction was to declare any response to the attacks to be premature. The third response was to sharply escalate the delivery of arms and chemical and biological agents. Again, no action was taken by the Security Council against this brutal use of chemical weapons because of the threat of veto by the very providers of these inhumane weapons. They are the same Powers that imposed this resolution on the Security Council today.

As soon as the United States saw that the victory of Iran was imminent in the war, it entered into direct confrontation with Iran by, among other things,

shooting down an Iranian passenger aircraft. The inaction of the Security Council was again outrageous.

I will not dwell on the abuse of this body and the greatest lies of modern history articulated here by yet again the same Powers when they attempted to justify their invasion of Iraq. The United States and the United Kingdom again forged their own coalition and invaded Iraq under the false pretext of searching for weapons of mass destruction.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to exercise its inalienable right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to build on its own scientific advances in developing various peaceful aspects of this technology. At the same time, as a victim of the use of weapons of mass destruction in the recent past, Iran has rejected and opposed the development and use of all such inhumane weapons on religious as well as security grounds. The Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran has on several occasions, including in his message to the Tehran international conference on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, held in April 2010 in Tehran, declared that nuclear weapons are forbidden. I brought that message to the attention of this body in my letter circulated as document S/2010/203, in which he stated:

"We consider the use of such weapons as *haram* (religiously forbidden) and believe that it is everyone's duty to make efforts to secure humanity against this great disaster." (S/2010/203, annex, p. 4)

Furthermore, the presence and statement of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) also underlined Iran's fundamental rejection of nuclear weapons, as well as the need to strengthen and revitalize the non-proliferation Treaty. This is yet another indication of our great commitment to NPT issues and our concern about the dangers of nuclear weapons and the urgent need for their total eradication from the face of the Earth.

Iran indeed has maintained close collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and indeed went even beyond its legal obligations in this cooperation. On many other occasions, I have already elaborated upon numerous examples of Iran's robust cooperation with the Agency; here, I shall limit myself to saying that, since February 2003, the Agency

has conducted over 4,500 person-days of inspections in Iran, which represent unprecedented verification activities in a State party since the creation of the Agency.

However, despite this unprecedented, robust and proactive cooperation with the IAEA, a few western countries continue their unfair and provocative behaviour and hostile attitudes against my country by getting the Security Council unnecessarily involved in this issue and pursuing such politically motivated resolutions. The Council has heard many false allegations against Iran, including that Lady Ashton was approached to meet with Mr. Jalili. I am not going to elaborate any further on that one.

A striking example of the lack of sincerity of those countries that make false accusations against Iran on the nuclear issue was manifest in connection with the deal on the supply of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, which was in fact put on the table after our request for the Agency's assistance in purchasing 20 per cent-enriched fuel specifically for the Tehran Research Reactor, which produces radioisotopes for medical purposes for more than 800,000 cancer-affected patients. While we have proved our ability to enrich uranium to higher levels for the production of the fuel needed for the Tehran Reactor, we preferred, in a gesture of good will, to exchange our low-enriched fuel of 3.5 per cent for fuel enriched to the 20 per cent level needed for the Reactor. However, a few countries, in a miscalculated and politically motivated action, tabled a resolution at the IAEA Board of Governors in November 2009, immediately following the discussion that we had in October. The same thing is happening here following Brazil and Turkey's deal with Iran. Again, something has happened to thwart the goodwill of those countries, which I hope will not occur.

In addition to that, provocative remarks made by some American and European officials have raised serious suspicions among the Iranian people and officials regarding the American and European officials' real intentions with respect to the uranium exchange proposal, damaged the atmosphere and deepened the sense of mistrust.

Despite this, we responded positively to the efforts of two members of the Council, Turkey and Brazil, which sincerely and at the highest level tried to pursue a deal that was actually what the Vienna Group had wished them to achieve. We displayed our good

will and seriousness by agreeing to that initiative, which led to the Tehran declaration on the exchange of fuel. Here, I should like to express the gratitude of the Iranian Government and nation for the sincere efforts made by the Governments of Brazil and Turkey, which opened a new window of opportunity for further cooperation. But instead of welcoming the Tehran declaration, unfortunately — and to the great surprise of the international community, which had overwhelmingly supported the declaration — the same few Powers immediately introduced this politically motivated resolution.

Those who unfairly accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of a lack of cooperation are today showing no respect for what they initially encouraged these two members of the Council to do. This yet again highlights the bitter fact that what matters to these few Powers is their narrow political interests. It shows that they will break their promises whenever they so wish and that they have respect neither for other members of the Council nor for the pledges they have themselves made. What is at stake today is the credibility of the Security Council, which has been turned into a tool in the toolbox of a few countries that do not hesitate to abuse it when and where their interests require.

One day, there should be an end to the unrestrained and rampant application of double standards that is unfortunately being practiced by this Council. Some powerful members of the Council should provide answers to the many legitimate questions of international public opinion with regard to their behaviour in this Council. They should explain why they have incapacitated this body to react to the threats of resort to the use of force, and even of nuclear weapons, against Iran, uttered so vividly at the highest levels by the United States and as reflected in the United States Nuclear Posture Review, which exempts Iran from negative security assurances. They should respond to the question of why they have never allowed the Council to take any action with regard to the threats made on a daily basis by the criminal Israeli regime against Iran in violation of the United Nations Charter.

Indeed, they should also explain to the international community why they are pushing the Council to take action against a nation that is only trying to exercise its legal and inalienable rights, while at the same time the same few countries resort to every possible effort to prevent the Security Council from

taking action against the Israeli regime's violations of the most basic principles of international law and international humanitarian law, as documented by the Goldstone report (A/HRC/12/48), and have repeatedly prevented this body from moving to stop the massive aggression of the Zionist regime against the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples. There should be an answer on the part of those who prevented this body from adopting a strong resolution in condemnation of the massacre on board the freedom flotilla ship and forced the Council to limit its action to adopting a mere presidential statement on that grave, brutal and criminal act, which was a clear example of State terrorism. There should also be an answer as to why this Council has not been given the slightest chance to address the issue of the Israeli regime's nuclear arsenal, despite its compulsive propensity to engage in aggression and carnage.

I wish to conclude by stressing that no amount of pressure or mischief will be able to break our nation's determination to pursue and defend its legal and inalienable rights. Iran, as one of the most powerful and stable countries in the region, has never bowed and will never bow to the hostile actions and pressures of these few Powers, and will continue to defend its rights.

I have again to express my sincere thanks to the delegations of Turkey and Brazil for voting against today's resolution, and to the Permanent Representative of Lebanon for not supporting it. History will commemorate those actions taken today in this Council.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): The representative of the United Kingdom has asked to take the floor a second time.

Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom): I regret the need to rebut some of the comments made by the Permanent Representative of Iran, but his distorted account of history — including personal attacks on my country — simply demean him and seem designed as an excuse for Iran not to respond to international concerns about its nuclear programme.

The attacks on the integrity of the Security Council are an insult to my colleagues here now and over the past four years. I hope that, on more sober reflection, Iran will respond honestly to the concerns that are expressed in the resolution that has just been adopted and that have been expressed by this Council

over the past four years on Iran's nuclear programme, and that it will engage seriously in negotiations on that programme.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. The Security

Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.



Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6336th meeting

Friday, 11 June 2010, 3 p.m.

New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Heller	(Mexico)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Mayr-Harting
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbačić
	Brazil	Mrs. Viotti
	China	Mr. Wang Min
	France	Mr. Araud
	Gabon	Mr. Issoze-Ngondet
	Japan	Mr. Okuda
	Lebanon	Mr. Salam
	Nigeria	Mr. Onemola
	Russian Federation	Mr. Karev
	Turkey	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda	Mr. Mugoya
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Mark Lyall Grant
	United States of America	Mr. DeLaurentis

Agenda

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506.



The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

It is so decided.

I invite Mr. Moreno-Ocampo to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2010/265, which contains a letter dated 28 May 2010 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a briefing by Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. Moreno-Ocampo: I thank the Security Council for the opportunity to report on the activities undertaken by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court since the last briefing (see S/PV. 6230).

I will first provide a summary of the cases investigated since the Security Council referred the situation to the International Criminal Court. My mandate is to end impunity for the most serious crimes, in order to contribute to the prevention of future crimes. We conducted three investigations on the Darfur situation.

In our first case, we investigated a consistent pattern of attacks against the civilian population during the period of 2003 to 2005. Sudanese armed forces would bomb villages in Darfur and surround them, and then ground troops would move in to kill, rape and pillage civilians in their homes. Those attacks forced

the displacement of a million civilians to a hostile environment.

The evidence showed the role of the then Minister of State for the Interior, Ahmad Harun, as coordinator of the Government of the Sudan forces, including recruiting into and the financing of the militia/Janjaweed in the Popular Defence Forces. An arrest warrant was also issued against a militia/Janjaweed leader, Ali Kushayb.

On 27 April 2007, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued arrest warrants against both individuals for war crimes and crimes against humanity. This is the case that is referred to in the note verbale (S/2010/265, annex), on which the judges made their decision about the lack of cooperation by the Republic of the Sudan.

In our second case, we investigated the continuous involvement of the entire Sudanese State apparatus in the attacks on the villages and, additionally, a different pattern of crimes committed against displaced persons. Such attacks are calculated to drive entire groups to inhospitable areas, where they die immediately, or into camps, where they die slowly.

On 4 March 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an arrest warrant against President Omer Al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the crimes of extermination and rape. The judges found that the obstruction of humanitarian assistance in Darfur is more than a bureaucratic problem. It constitutes the crime of extermination. After forcing civilians out of their homes, Sudanese forces would deny any meaningful assistance to those who reached the camps for the internally displaced, forcing the United Nations and others to set up the largest humanitarian operation in the world, and yet obstructing their life-saving efforts every step of the way.

I must be clear: the crime of extermination does not require killing by bullets. It consists of intentionally inflicting conditions of life — inter alia, the deprivation of access to food and medicine — calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population. That is extermination.

In our third case, we are prosecuting the three commanders of the rebel group that attacked peacekeepers in an event that took place in Haskanita in September 2007, causing the deaths of 12 African Union peacekeepers and leaving thousands of people

without protection. The Judges have found that the attack constituted a crime under the Statute; however, they found the evidence insufficient to establish the criminal responsibility of rebel commander Abu Garda. The Office will therefore present additional evidence. We anticipate that a new confirmation hearing will then be held in the near future. These are the persons identified as most responsible for the most serious crimes committed in Darfur over the past six years. There is no other case at this stage.

Let me now turn to the main point of my briefing today — cooperation. In the past, the Government of the Sudan recognized the role of the International Criminal Court and provided cooperation in other cases before the Court, including for the execution of arrest warrants. On 2 October 2005, the Government of the Sudan, without this Council's involvement, signed an agreement with my Office to implement the arrest warrants issued by the ICC against Joseph Kony and four leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army. This cooperation was of critical importance to removing the leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army from their safe haven in the Sudan.

In the Darfur case, cooperation was forthcoming for two years. Judicial records and other documents were shared under article 53 of the Rome Statute, Sudanese officials were interviewed in Khartoum, including as suspects under article 55, and five missions were undertaken to Khartoum, the last in January and February 2007. In June 2007, the Government of the Sudan accepted the notification of the arrest warrants against Harun and Kushayb. Since then, however, there has been a public and consistent refusal to cooperate with the Court and to comply with resolution 1593 (2005).

Therefore, on 25 May 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued its decision informing the Security Council about the lack of cooperation by the Republic of the Sudan. In the decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber considers that the Court has taken all possible measures to ensure the cooperation of the Republic of the Sudan. The decision stresses that the obligation of the Republic of the Sudan to cooperate with the Court stems directly from the Charter of the United Nations and resolution 1593 (2005). The Chamber concludes that the Republic of the Sudan is failing to comply with its cooperation obligations stemming from resolution 1593 (2005) in relation to the enforcement of the

warrants of arrest issued by the Chamber against Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb.

Under resolution 1593 (2005), the Security Council decided that the "Government of the Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor". The Government of the Sudan, a sovereign territorial State, has the primary responsibility and is fully able to implement the warrants issued by the Court. It has not done so, and the Judges have taken the step to make a decision and notify it to this Council.

While cooperation from the Sudan is lacking, it is noteworthy that, from all other actors, cooperation is forthcoming. There are 111 States parties to the Rome Statute with a legal obligation to enforce the Court's arrest warrants. Additionally, the Security Council has urged all United Nations Members to cooperate with the Court. I wish to confirm that, as of today, no other State Member of the United Nations and no other party to the conflict has refused cooperation with the Court in the Darfur situation. To the contrary, many States, including non-States parties to the Rome Statute, following up on resolution 1593 (2005), have taken steps within their power to encourage cooperation by the Sudan and to isolate and ultimately facilitate the surrender of the individuals sought by the Court. They have maintained and expressed public and diplomatic support for the Court and have severed all non-essential contacts with those subject to ICC warrants.

Let me give a few recent examples. President Jacob Zuma of South Africa emphasized on 4 June 2010 that South Africa would arrest anyone under an ICC arrest warrant who travelled to South Africa. This was a strong message of respect for resolution 1593 (2005) and of support for accountability. President Nicolas Sarkozy took the unprecedented decision to move the date and location of the twenty-fifth France-Africa Summit to avoid meeting with a person who is the object of an arrest warrant. This was a strong message of respect for resolution 1593 (2005) and of support for accountability. President Yoweri Museveni recalled that he would abide by his ICC obligations should President Omar Al-Bashir attempt to represent the Sudan at the next African Union Summit in Kampala, Kenya, on the occasion of the summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development held in March in Nairobi, stated the same.

Non-States parties have also asserted that those subject to an arrest warrant would need to face justice. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has repeatedly reiterated the need to comply with resolution 1593 (2005) and to respect the decisions of the Court. The African Union and the League of Arab States, in addition to the United Nations and other international actors, have endeavoured for years to help to end impunity in Darfur. The implementation of the Mbeki Panel recommendations and the July 2008 Arab League solution package would be important steps towards ending crimes in Darfur.

In a statement on 23 March 2010, President Mbeki, as the head of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel, said, "there is a perfect understanding between the Panel and the International Criminal Court". President Mbeki explained that the arrest warrants issued by the Court are a matter of fact and can be reviewed only by the ICC Judges, but he added that the rest of the crimes committed in Darfur should be addressed by the Sudan domestically, and the African Union Panel has formulated recommendations in this regard.

All such complementary efforts show compliance with the Security Council's resolution and the Court's decision. Today, the Security Council has the opportunity to further this collective effort. The Council already reminded the Government of the Sudan of its obligation to respect resolution 1593 (2005) during its visit to Khartoum from 16 to 17 June 2007.

The Security Council also, in adopting presidential statement S/PRST/2008/21, referred explicitly to the transmission of the arrest warrants against Harun and Kushayb, and urged the Sudan to cooperate fully and to provide any necessary assistance. I hope that the Security Council can build further upon such efforts.

I should like to brief the Council on the alleged crimes committed during the past six months. I would have liked to report that the conditions in Darfur had improved and that crimes had stopped. Sadly, the truth is that attacks against civilians not participating in the conflict continue.

In February, immediately after the signing of a peace agreement and a public commitment to peace, 100,000 civilians were forcibly displaced by Sudanese armed forces in the Jebel Marra. The modus operandi was the same as the one used by Ahmad Harun from 2003 to 2005 — air bombardments followed by attacks

by the Sudanese armed forces integrating with militia/Janjaweed. It was identical.

Sadly, the crime of extermination against the millions displaced into camps continues to be committed. Acts aimed at inflicting inhumane conditions of life continue. Under-Secretary-General Holmes reported to the Council last week on the difficulties of accessing many areas and the problems of finding interlocutors in Khartoum to address those issues. Those are not technical or bureaucratic issues or the result of disorganization. The decision to expel humanitarian organizations and the accumulation of obstacles constitute a policy — a criminal policy — of identified Sudanese officials with the aim of committing the crime of extermination.

Gender crimes remain unabated in Darfur. In his report of 26 May, the United Nations independent expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, Justice Mohammed Chande Othman from Tanzania, wrote:

"Acts of sexual violence, particularly against female internally displaced persons, is still of concern in Darfur... In most instances, the perpetrators were identified as individuals or groups of armed men often dressed in military uniforms. In recent times, women living in close proximity to military camps have also become vulnerable to sexual attacks from soldiers ... The military authorities deny the rape allegations, claiming that the soldiers were engaged in consensual relationships with the women." (*A/HRC/14/41, para. 59*)

Of even greater concern, the independent expert notes that victims are increasingly discouraged from reporting rape and sexual violence because they know they will not benefit from remedial action. Rapes are not stopping; reporting is stopping.

This is consistent with the finding of the African Union High-Level Panel that "faith in the criminal justice system has been severely eroded", and with the findings of others. This is in line as well with the 2009 report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, which states:

"There appears to be an overwhelming apathy towards, and unwillingness to investigate, acts of sexual and gender-based violence." (*A/2009/562, annex, para. 304*)

There is a need for an updated comprehensive report by the Secretariat on the current situation in the camps and villages. The fragmented information on rapes and on the obstacles to humanitarian assistance must be put together to allow the international community to consider the current extent of the suffering of the civilians in Darfur.

As I mentioned in my report, there is also an opportunity for the Council, as it prepares for the anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000) and for its special session of October 2010 under the Ugandan presidency, to implement its groundbreaking resolutions on gender violence in specific situations where crimes are ongoing.

To conclude, five years ago the Security Council considered that the Darfur situation constituted a threat to peace and security and decided to refer the situation to the Court as part of its efforts to find a global solution to the conflict. Security Council members presented the need to integrate four different tracks in Darfur: humanitarian assistance, peacekeepers, political negotiations and justice. The facts unveiled by the Prosecution and adjudicated by the Judges shed light on some of the problems faced on these different tracks.

The impunity of Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb is one of the main problems. It carries a price. Ali Kushayb is a tribal leader who still exercises power in his own area in South Sudan, and a clear example to other Janjaweed that they can continue committing crimes. There is impunity.

The case of Harun is even more serious. His expertise is in mobilizing and using militias to attack civilians and disguising his activities. He was allegedly involved in the worst attacks against civilians in the Nuba mountains during the 1990s. From 1997 to 2000, he was Executive Director of the Peace and Resettlement Administration in South Kordofan, which was in reality a secret service organization that collected information to prepare attacks on villages. From 2003 to 2005, as Minister of State for the Interior, Harun coordinated the attacks on civilians in their villages in Darfur. Between 2005 and 2009, Harun was the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, managing the crimes in the camps for displaced persons in Darfur.

In my December 2007 briefing (see S/PV.5789), I highlighted to the Council that Ahmad Harun had then been appointed to a committee on human rights violations and breaches of the Constitution in the South

and North. In my subsequent briefing in June 2008 (see S/PV.5905), I reported that, as a member of that committee, Harun was sent to Abyei to manage the conflict. And, as Council members know, Abyei was burned down by tribal militias, with 50,000 citizens displaced.

Normally fugitives from justice go into hiding. Prosecutors have to unearth their whereabouts. This is not the case here. We know where Ahmad Harun. He is currently the Governor of South Kordofan. He should be arrested before he commits new crimes in his new position.

To conclude, I should like to clarify that any discussion of the evidence presented by my Office or of the charges included in the arrest warrants should be conducted in the courtroom in The Hague. The Judges' decisions will not be changed by political negotiations.

The decision on Sudanese non-cooperation in relation to Harun and Kushayb was adopted by the Judges and forwarded to the Security Council. The means to secure compliance by the Sudan with its obligations under resolution 1593 (2005) are a prerogative of the Council. The Council has dealt before with States' non-compliance in connection with the enforcement of arrest warrants. I hope that the Council can acknowledge the Judges' decision and follow up on it between now and my next report in December.

I would urge Council members to ensure that the arrest of Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb be a request that this Organization continues to insist on, through its representatives and envoys in the Sudan, as a critical condition for securing peace and stability in Darfur. This meeting and the Council's meeting on Monday offer a perfect opportunity for its members to integrate the request for the arrest of Harun and Kushayb into the general strategy relating to Darfur and the Sudan. Resolution 1593 (2005), as well as all other related Security Council resolutions, should be complied with.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Mr. Moreno-Ocampo for his briefing.

There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I now invite members to continue our discussion of the matter in a closed meeting.

The meeting rose at 3.40 p.m.

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
11 June 2010

Original: English

Official communiqué of the 6337th (closed) meeting of the Security Council

**Held in private at Headquarters, New York, on Friday,
11 June 2010, at 3.45 p.m.**

In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General in place of a verbatim record:

“At its 6337th meeting, held in private on 11 June 2010, the Security Council considered the item entitled ‘Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan’.

“The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of those countries, who had so requested, to participate in the consideration without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.

“Pursuant to the decision taken at the 6336th meeting, the President recognized the presence at the Council table of Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, in accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.

“The members of the Council and Mr. Moreno-Ocampo had an exchange of views.”





Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6338th meeting

Monday, 14 June 2010, 10 a.m.
New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Heller	(Mexico)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Mayr-Harting
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbačić
	Brazil	Mrs. Viotti
	China	Mr. Li Baodong
	France	Mr. Araud
	Gabon	Mr. Issoze-Ngondet
	Japan	Mr. Takasu
	Lebanon	Mr. Salam
	Nigeria	Mr. Onemola
	Russian Federation	Mr. Churkin
	Turkey	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda	Mr. Rugunda
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Mark Lyall Grant
	United States of America	Ms. Rice

Agenda

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506.

10-40334 (E)



Please recycle

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend invitations under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Chairperson of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur; Mr. Djibril Bassolé, Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur; Mr. Ibrahim Gambari, Joint African Union-United Nations Special Representative for Darfur; and Mr. Haile Menkerios, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Mr. Mbeki, Mr. Bassolé, Mr. Gambari and Mr. Menkerios. I now give the floor to Mr. Mbeki.

Mr. Mbeki: We would like to thank you, Mr. President, for giving us this opportunity to engage the Council on the issue of the Sudan.

As members will recall, the last time we were here, in December 2009, we informed the Council that the African Union (AU) had expanded our mandate to follow up on its decisions on Darfur on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the process of democratization in the Sudan. Indeed, our Panel has been doing what it can to honour that mandate. In that regard, I am happy to inform the Council that, by common agreement, our Panel works in close cooperation with the three institutions that are playing a central role in assisting the people of the Sudan to resolve their problems. I refer here to the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and the AU-United Nations Joint Chief Mediator for Darfur — all of which are correctly represented at this meeting and will, as the President has said, address the Council.

I am certain that there is no need for us to convince the Council about the importance of that cooperation, which enables our four institutions to share information, coordinate their actions and support one another while fully respecting their various mandates. On behalf of our Panel, I would like to take this opportunity once more to thank Joint Special Representative Ibrahim Gambari, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Haile Menkerios and Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassolé for the opportunity that they have given to our Panel to work with them and the institutions they lead, which I am certain will greatly assist in accelerating progress towards meeting the goals on the Sudan, which are shared by the African Union and the United Nations.

In that regard, I am certain that the Council is aware of the fact of the Joint AU-United Nations meeting on the Sudan held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 7 May, and of the statement the two organizations issued at the end of that meeting, which reflects the scope of their shared understanding and coordinated approach. Similarly, the Council will also be familiar with the fact of the 8 May meeting, again held in Addis Ababa, convened by the AU and the United Nations, which brought together the representatives of the Governments and intergovernmental organizations that are actively involved in work to help resolve the challenges that the Sudan faces and which included all the countries neighbouring the Sudan.

We were indeed very pleased that that inclusive meeting again reached a common agreement on the approach towards the major challenges facing the Sudan and agreed that the AU and the United Nations should convene a bi-monthly consultative forum to ensure proper coordination of the interventions of the entirety of the international community. Once again, we are certain that the Council is familiar with the decisions adopted at that meeting. The joint conveners of the consultative forum, that is, the AU and the United Nations, are determined that the forum should meet as was agreed and effectively carry out the principal tasks for which it was established, namely, to ensure the effective coordination of international action on the Sudan.

As the Council is aware, the 8 May meeting agreed with the AU and the United Nations that the global political agreement on Darfur should be concluded this year, ahead of the holding of the Southern Sudan referendum. I am happy to say that the

Government of the Sudan has agreed with that proposal. Accordingly, as did the 7 May and 8 May Addis Ababa meetings, we fully support the Doha negotiations, which are focused specifically on concluding a peace agreement involving all the belligerents, as well as a framework agreement. We therefore fully support the efforts of the Joint Chief Mediator, supported by the Government of the State of Qatar, to bring all the belligerents into the peace negotiations with a view to concluding those negotiations as speedily as possible. Similarly, we support the efforts of the Mediator and Qatar to mobilize Darfur civil society to support the Doha peace process.

Again as agreed at the 7 and 8 May meetings, we will take steps immediately to prepare for the convening of the fully inclusive process, in the form of a Darfur-Darfur conference targeted at concluding a global political agreement. Again, I am happy to inform the Council that the Government of the Sudan has agreed to that. In that regard, I should also mention that, when we return to the Sudan later this month, we will engage the officials designated by the Government of the Sudan to work on the details relating to the implementation of the decisions of the African Union on the issues of justice and reconciliation in Darfur. Our intention in this context is that, by the time the Darfur-Darfur conference considers the item of justice and reconciliation, we should have agreed on all the relevant details with the Government of the Sudan.

With regard to Darfur, we would also like to mention that when we return to the Sudan later this month, we will again join the Government and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur to consider a detailed programme to improve the security situation in Darfur. The meeting will also take into account proposals on this important issue that have been elaborated by the United States Special Envoy, General Scott Gration.

Sustained improvement in the security situation in Darfur would help to create the conditions to help the refugees and internally displaced persons to realize their wish to return to the villages from which they were forcibly removed. In this regard, it is obvious that such voluntary returns as may take place will have to be accompanied by a process of reconstruction and development to assist the returnees to resettle and build better lives for themselves.

With regard to matters relating to the CPA, the Panel has convened for 21 June the first meeting of the teams that will negotiate the post-referendum arrangements, taking into account both possible outcomes of the Southern Sudan referendum. This meeting will mark the beginning of the post-referendum negotiations. As agreed with the CPA parties, the Panel will then be on standby to assist the parties in the event that they require intervention to resolve any of the matters on the post-referendum agenda.

Again, as agreed with the parties, the Panel will work with them to help resolve outstanding CPA matters, in particular the finalization of matters relating to the North-South border, as well as Abyei. We will work on these matters together with UNMIS, as we will with regard to supporting the newly-constituted Southern Sudan Referendum Commission, bearing in mind the urgency that attends all these CPA issues. Similarly, later this month we will begin work, especially with UNMIS and the Sudan Council of Churches, aimed at helping to end the communal conflicts in Southern Sudan which continue to claim many lives.

We will also continue to work, particularly with the political parties in Southern Sudan, as we did during the general elections, to help prepare the conditions to ensure that the January 2011 Southern Sudan and Abyei referendums are free and fair. In this regard, we are confident that UNMIS will play a vital role to assist in organizing those referendums.

We will also continue to attend to the important issue of the further democratization of the Sudan. In this regard, in particular, we are working towards convening a forum of the Sudanese political parties that will seek to develop a national consensus on the major challenges facing the country, including the process of democratization.

Like the Sudanese themselves and our United Nations partners, our Panel is fully conscious of the complexity of all the matters I have mentioned and the time pressures under which the correct solutions have to be found. In this regard, and to conclude, we would like to take this opportunity to thank the United Nations, the European Union, other intergovernmental organizations, and individual Governments, including members of this Council, for the support they have

extended to the Panel to empower us to do the work expected of us.

We are pleased that both this Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council remain seized of the question of the Sudan, convinced that this will assist those of us on the AU Panel on the Sudan, in UNAMID, UNMIS and the Darfur mediation more effectively and expeditiously to discharge our responsibilities.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Mr. Mbeki for his statement.

I now give the floor to Mr. Menkerios.

Mr. Menkerios: I would like to begin by thanking the Council for this opportunity to report on the situation in the Sudan, specifically on the remaining phases in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

Let me state at the very outset that both signatories to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement — the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) — continue to express commitment to the full implementation of the CPA, including the timely conduct of the referendums in Southern Sudan and Abyei, as well as the popular consultations in the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states. They also continue to reiterate their readiness to respect the outcomes of these processes. So far, the parties have maintained progress in CPA implementation without major breakdowns emerging from the recent elections with parallel victories. As they approach the end of the implementation period, the stakes are higher as they face the outcomes in the referendums and the final phases of the 2005 peace agreement.

The path ahead is certainly not without challenges and could be divided into two broad phases. First, the peaceful and credible conduct of the referendums in Southern Sudan and Abyei, scheduled for 9 January 2011, and popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. The second, perhaps more important challenge is the peaceful implementation of the outcomes of these processes.

The immediate tasks that remain for the proper and timely implementation of the CPA are the formation of the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan; the formation and launching of the referendums commissions for

Southern Sudan and Abyei; the demarcation of the North-South border, as well as the Abyei border; the commencement of the popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile; and the initiation of and progress on negotiations between the parties on post-referendum arrangements. Both parties are preoccupied with the formation of their respective Governments — a task we expect to be announced within this week or the next.

Widespread concerns exist about the tight time frame for the preparation and conduct of the referendums. The postponement of the national elections from January 2009, as originally scheduled, to April 2010 diminished the time available to prepare for and conduct the referendums. Since the announcement of the election results, the key priority has been and continues to be the formation and establishment of the referendum commissions for Southern Sudan and Abyei. There is no more time to lose.

On the referendum in Southern Sudan, I am glad to inform the Council that the two sides have agreed on the formation of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission and last week tabled their proposal to Parliament for approval, which is expected in the next few days. The United Nations awaits the formation of the Commission to start working with it. The priority for the Commission, once established, is to develop an operational plan and a budget so that resource needs can be identified and mobilized. In addition, the Commission needs to set up offices at all administrative levels, recruit and train staff, conduct voter registration, oversee the conduct of the referendum and announce its outcome. This is a tall order. I believe that if the parties act and cooperate on their commitments with the sense of urgency the situation calls for, a timely conduct of the referendums is possible, albeit challenging.

As requested by the Council, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) is finalizing its plans and preparations to assist the parties with the conduct of the referendums and the popular consultations on time, consistent with the provisions of the CPA. The parties need to be encouraged — indeed, urged — to push on with the necessary preparations without further delay.

On the referendum in Abyei, the parties have not yet agreed on who is eligible to vote. This issue has

been referred to the Abyei referendum commission to finalize. While the parties have nominated their members to the Commission, differences persist on who should chair it, as the chairperson would have the deciding vote, including on eligibility. The resolution of the eligibility issue and establishment of a commission are top priorities for the Abyei referendum process to commence. Moreover, demarcation of Abyei's borders on the basis of the Permanent Court of Arbitration decision continues to be stalled, for reasons related to the lack of agreement on residency and eligibility to vote in the referendum. My impression from informal discussions with the parties, the NCP in particular, is that the issues of residency and border demarcation in Abyei are unlikely to be easily resolved outside a broader post-referendum agreement on grazing rights, resource sharing and citizenship, among other issues.

The Ad Hoc Technical Border Committee has presented its report to the parties, in which it describes areas of agreement regarding the border and sections where it was unable to agree. It is a welcome development that the Committee has, with United Nations technical and logistical support, started to demarcate the sections of the border it has agreed upon, with the exception of Abyei, citing security threats. It is imperative, however, that the parties settle the remaining contentious parts of the border and demarcate them before the referendum is held.

The CPA gives the people of the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states the right to decide on their future governance through a process of popular consultations. These are to be conducted by elected state assemblies and should provide an opportunity for a fresh approach to centre-periphery and minority issues that, if properly implemented, could serve as a model for the rest of the Sudan. However, a potential continuation of the original North-South conflict is also possible if the process is not handled with the transparency and openness it demands. It is also of concern that the timeline for the meaningful conduct of these consultations remain tight, especially in Southern Kordofan, due to the postponement of the census and elections.

During my most recent briefing to the Council, I emphasized that unity and secession do not need to be a zero-sum game for the North and the South. It is thus advisable for the two sides to continue to cooperate for their mutual benefit, whether in unity or separation.

The goal of making unity attractive, therefore, should be a long-term one, irrespective of the outcome. In interactions with the leaders of the two parties, we have advised that separation should not be considered a divorce, and that in the case of a vote for separation, maintaining close linkages between the South and the North is in the interests of both.

In this regard, agreement on post-referendum arrangements not only becomes crucial for long-term peace and stability in the Sudan and the region, but will also seriously affect the smooth implementation of the CPA in the remaining phases of the interim period. Accordingly, the parties have been engaged in discussions and must be encouraged and supported in reaching agreement on key issues of common concern. Formal negotiations between the parties are scheduled to start on 21 June with the assistance of the African Union (AU) High-Level Implementation Panel, and we will be fully supporting this effort.

The security situation around much of the border and within Southern Sudan remains of great concern. Sporadic clashes between the Misseriya and Rizeigat armed militias and the SPLM around the borders of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Western Bahr el-Ghazal have continued. Within Southern Sudan, rebellious armed elements in Unity and Jonglei states in particular continue to cause security risks, as does the Lord's Resistance Army in Western Equatoria. UNMIS continues to work with the parties to help address these security threats.

The overall situation in Southern Sudan requires a concerted and comprehensive capacity-building effort, irrespective of the outcome of the referendum. This effort would, as an immediate priority, require a coherent strategy on security sector reform and institutional capacity-building. A development plan that focuses on the provision of basic services in the short term and sustained economic growth in the long term is also a must. The Government of Southern Sudan, with the assistance of the United Nations country team and other partners, is in the process of refining such a plan. It is only through such a multifaceted approach that we can help ensure a peaceful transition and effective protection of civilians both in the short and long terms.

The United Nations has stood firm in its commitment to assisting the parties in implementing the CPA. UNMIS and the United Nations country team

stand ready to help them to conclude this peace process in a way that contributes to continuing peace, stability and progress. With regard to support for the referendums, the United Nations is ready to extend technical and logistical assistance to the two commissions as soon as they become operational. We have been providing and will continue to provide the requisite assistance for the conduct of the popular consultations. In order to support these processes, we have planned and begun to redeploy resources and staff to locations beyond those covered during the elections.

The UNMIS military contingent is in the process of identifying possible hotspots and revising its deployment accordingly. We will continue to train and help develop the institutional capacity of the Southern Sudan Police Service. As requested by the Council, we have revised and are implementing a more effective approach to the protection of civilians, which is no longer a task entrusted to a particular unit but is an integral component of all Mission operations. The strategy being implemented entails reinforced presence at the state level where a state coordinator manages and directs the efforts of all Mission components to protect civilians; a more flexible military deployment will further enhance this effort.

In partnership with the AU High-Level Implementation Panel, and in collaboration with other key partners, we have been engaging the parties on all processes that require further agreement and shall continue to do so. In this regard, a consultative forum involving key international stakeholders met in Addis Ababa in May and agreed to support the partnership of the AU and the United Nations in taking the lead on facilitating progress and cooperation in the peaceful implementation of the CPA and beyond.

International monitoring of the referendums is another important issue. The political significance of the referendums to the future of the people of the Sudan, and indeed to the whole region, has led to calls by the two parties that they be conducted in a transparent and credible manner, and thus with much closer scrutiny by the international community than the elections received. In fact, the two parties have separately informed UNMIS that they desire United Nations engagement at a much greater level than during the elections to help ensure that the referendums are prepared and conducted without any interference from one side or the other. This implies a wider scope of engagement for UNMIS that exceeds its current

mandate. We have advised both parties that they should jointly define this greater level of United Nations engagement and present their request to the Organization together. We await this joint request to pass it on to the Secretary-General.

In all this, the international community must not only encourage and urge the parties to stay the course to ensure the timely conclusion of CPA implementation and continued peace and mutual benefit, but also assist them in this endeavour. This will require political and material support both in the conduct of the remaining processes and in ensuring a soft landing in the post-referendum period.

There is much at stake for the future of the people of the Sudan, the region and the African continent in the outcome of the referendums and popular consultations. The Sudan is a microcosm of Africa, and its stability or instability will have far-reaching implications. Alongside the exercise of self-determination for the peoples of Southern Sudan and Abyei, and popular consultations in the concerned states, the Sudan needs to be encouraged and assisted to expand the democratic space opened by the recent elections and establish a broad-based system of national governance that will lead to a more equitable society and durable peace.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Mr. Menkerios for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Gambari.

Mr. Gambari: I am very pleased and honoured to address the members of the Security Council for the second time in less than a month. Unlike my previous briefing (see S/PV.6318), during which I had the opportunity to introduce the Secretary-General's report on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), this briefing is mainly on the unfolding security situation in Darfur and how it affects the life of ordinary citizens, as well as its implications for the work of UNAMID and the international community. I will also comment briefly on UNAMID's engagement in the political process on the ground in Darfur in collaboration with the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel under the leadership of President Mbeki and Joint Chief Mediator Bassolé.

On 20 May (see S/PV.6318), I informed Council members that, during the first week of the month of

May, parts of Darfur witnessed a serious escalation of hostilities between the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) of Khalil Ibrahim and Government forces. It saddens me to inform the Council that the fighting between the two belligerent parties is still continuing and that the security situation in parts of Darfur remains tense and volatile.

Following JEM's withdrawal from the Jebel Moon area, JEM forces are now spread in small pockets in North and Southern Darfur, notably in the areas towards Southern Kordofan, engaging Government forces in offensive and defensive clashes. Of great concern is the unprecedented increase in the number of fatalities, resulting largely from the recent clashes: 447 deaths were recorded for the month of May 2010 alone.

Movement of equipment and the build-up of troops continue to be witnessed on both sides, and it is expected, unfortunately, that the military confrontations may indeed continue for some time unless urgent efforts to ensure a ceasefire are made by the international community.

As members of the Council are aware, UNAMID's core mandate remains focused on the protection of civilians. In implementing its strategy for the protection of civilians, UNAMID is continuing to intensify its military and police patrols through progressive increases in its medium- and long-range patrols, as well as strengthening joint civilian and military 24/7 patrolling of selected camps for internally displaced persons. New directives have also been recently issued to the military and police components of UNAMID with regard to robust patrolling and to a robust response to attacks on our military and police personnel. This was reflected in the response of Senegalese police during a recent attack on them in Western Darfur.

As part of this new strategy, and with a view to making this activity more effective and efficient, UNAMID is planning, in collaboration with the relevant Government of Sudan authorities, to assist in opening more roads and rehabilitating others in order to increase access and expand the scope of the Mission's protection mandate. These actions are being taken in coordination with other protection actors such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and UNICEF. Meanwhile, UNAMID continues to provide full assistance and logistical support to the humanitarian community in order to expand humanitarian space and access.

The recent upsurge in fighting has created very serious hindrances to the effective implementation of UNAMID's protection mandate, as well as to the provision of humanitarian assistance to those in dire need of such support and assistance. Since the renewed fighting began, civilian populations have moved away from places where the fighting and aerial bombardments were taking place. From Jebel Moon, they moved towards the Chadian border and to areas east of Jebel Moon as well as to some urban centres, including El Fasher. From the hot spots in Jebel Marra and South Darfur, they went into hiding in more secure locations around those areas.

As a result of the denial of access as well as logistical constraints and security concerns, it has not been possible to determine the exact numbers, but the figures for persons displaced as a result of the recent fighting range between 10,000 and 50,000 in the region. Of greatest concern is the continuing denial of access for the humanitarian community to large parts of Jebel Marra since the onset of fighting there in February 2010. An assessment mission to the lowlands of eastern Jebel Marra took place at the beginning of April, but follow-up has been impossible to date due to the worsening of the security situation and lack of access to areas controlled either by the Government of Sudan or the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdel Wahid faction. Overall, these new displacements are posing great challenges in terms of delivery of humanitarian assistance and provision of basic services to those in need. However, in the last week, there has been no fighting reported, and JEM has in fact signalled its willingness to release some prisoners.

Meanwhile, UNAMID continues to engage in ongoing negotiations with the Government authorities and the armed movements in order to ensure wider access, including for humanitarian assessment missions, to the deep field locations where increased violence and displacements have been witnessed. On 10 June, just last Thursday, I met with Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, with whom I raised the very serious concerns of both UNAMID and the humanitarian community on the security agencies' restriction of access to areas of recent clashes, which has prevented access to affected populations and other displaced and wounded persons in those locations.

I am pleased to note that, shortly after our meeting, the Government of the Sudan gave instructions to the relevant agencies to allow, immediately and

wherever possible, access for both UNAMID and the humanitarian agencies. It was also agreed at my follow-up meeting at the Foreign Ministry that a meeting would be held shortly between UNAMID, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the national intelligence and security services to discuss these issues and carry them further. I have accordingly instructed the Force Commander to follow up on this immediately. I am informed that the Government of Sudan has lifted the ban on helicopter flights, as of yesterday, 13 June 2010.

It is essential for the international community, and in particular for those States with leverage on the belligerents, to impress on them the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities accompanied by unfettered and unhindered access for UNAMID, the United Nations country team and humanitarian agencies to all areas of recent clashes in order to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance to the affected populations and displaced persons. Only then will the security situation facilitate and enhance the possibility for a negotiated settlement through the Doha peace process, on which my colleague, Mr. Djibril Bassolé will shortly be briefing the members of the Council. It is essential to reiterate to all concerned that there can be no military solution to the Darfur crisis and that a speedy return by all to negotiations is the only viable option.

Let me now briefly turn to the other issue on the Council's agenda relating to the complementary political process in Darfur. One of UNAMID's mandated tasks is to support and assist the Joint Chief Mediator in his work to bring the parties and the stakeholders together to agree on a comprehensive peace agreement. In this regard, coordination and collaboration between UNAMID and the Joint Mediation at all levels is going on smoothly. UNAMID has a key role to play with respect to the inputs from civil society in the ongoing talks, the design of ceasefire implementation mechanisms and the actual implementation of those agreements.

As part of this collaboration, UNAMID now has the responsibility to organize and lead, along with the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel, a Darfur conference to facilitate public agreement on issues related to the peace process. The conference aims to facilitate the achievement of an inclusive and comprehensive political settlement for Darfur by or hopefully before the end of this year in advance of the referendum for Southern Sudan. While coordination in

this regard is currently ongoing with both the Implementation Panel and the Mediation, UNAMID is finalizing plans to ensure that all the diverse groups and populations of Darfur are given the opportunity to make substantial inputs to the negotiations and to the outcome of discussions on the future of their region and the future of their country.

This is where we are at the moment in Darfur. I hope that, after its deliberations on these important and topical issues, the Council will provide support and guidance for our work in our collective efforts to bring peace and stability to the whole of Sudan — because Darfur cannot be considered in isolation from the whole of Sudan. In addition to support and action in bringing current fighting in Darfur to an end and encouraging all the parties, including encouraging those who are still outside the Doha process to join it, the support of the Council will also be needed to encourage those Member States that are in a position to do so to provide critical enablers to UNAMID to enhance its effectiveness in implementing its core mandate. This includes but is not limited to the provision of medium utility helicopters, transport companies and aerial reconnaissance units. I am sure we can count on the continuing support of the Security Council on these matters.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Mr. Gambari for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Bassolé.

Mr. Bassolé (*spoke in French*): At the outset I would like to convey to you, Sir, and to the members of the Security Council our gratitude for the Council's consistent interest in and support for the peace process in Darfur and to the work of the Joint Mediation Team, which I lead in an exemplary and fruitful partnership with the State of Qatar and the support of regional and international partners.

I welcome the opportunity afforded me today to brief the Council on the results we have achieved to date, and especially to share with the Council the activities of the Mediation Team within the framework of the Doha negotiations, the ultimate goal of which is to achieve a final, inclusive and comprehensive peace agreement in Darfur.

It will be recalled that, in order to achieve this objective, the mediators — in consultation with the United Nations, the African Union, the League of Arab States and regional actors — had decided to focus their

efforts concomitantly on three main axes: direct dialogue and negotiations among the parties to the conflict; raising awareness and involving civil society in the peace process; and improving relations between Chad and the Sudan. With the backing of the international community, these efforts resulted in the signing in Doha of a Framework Agreement on 23 February 2010 between the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Government of National Unity of the Sudan, which was initialled in N'Djamena, and a Framework Agreement for a ceasefire on 18 March between the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) and the Government of the Sudan.

Along with the recommendations of the first forum of Darfur's civil society, these agreements constitute the reference points and the agenda of the peace negotiations, which resumed on 6 June in Doha. Indeed, following the suspension of peace negotiations on 7 April, due to the schedule of the recent elections in the Sudan, the mediators invited the signatories of the Framework Agreements to Doha to continue efforts to finalize the final peace negotiations. I take this opportunity to draw Council members' attention to the fact that the Government of the Sudan and the LJM have seized the opportunity of the resumption to reaffirm their commitment to the Doha peace process as the only forum for peace negotiations on Darfur.

The important issues for the newly launched negotiations are to finalize the ceasefire agreements and security arrangements with the assistance of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), and to draft the terms of reference for a peace agreement based on the Sudan People's Initiative, civil society recommendations contained in the Doha Declaration, the achievements of the Darfur Peace Agreements, the recommendations of the African Union High-Level Panel for Darfur and the Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue Outcome Document, as well as the peace offers and proposals of the parties to the conflict.

If definitive and lasting peace is to be achieved in Darfur, it is imperative that all armed movements without exception adhere to the peace negotiations. The mediators will therefore pursue their consultations with Mr. Khalil Ibrahim aimed at bringing the JEM back to the negotiation table so that, as a priority and in conformity with the commitments contained in the agreements of 17 February 2009 and 20 February 2010, the Government and the JEM can finalize and adopt the

draft ceasefire agreement submitted by the mediators on 3 March 2010, as well as the draft agenda. The Government of the Sudan and the JEM must cease their armed clashes, or risk irreparably undermining all efforts to promote peace, security, reconciliation and socio-economic development both in Darfur and the neighbouring region of Eastern Chad.

In addition to the effective involvement of all armed movements of Darfur in the peace negotiations, the role of civil society is also of special importance, as stipulated in paragraph 10 of resolution 1828 (2008) and paragraph 6 of the Framework Agreement of 18 March 2010 concluded between the Government and the JLM. This is why, in conformity with the Doha Declaration of 20 November 2009, the mediators and the State of Qatar, with the assistance of UNAMID, will, during the first half of the month of July 2010, convene the second forum of civil society representatives of Darfur, who represent displaced persons, refugees, women, young people, opinion leaders and all components of the Darfurian community.

The main objective of the forum will be to back the efforts of the Mediators to assist the parties to the conflict in defining the objectives to be achieved and to determine the modalities for the implementation of any peace agreement to the benefit of the people of Darfur. In addition, it will enable the mediators to promote civil society ownership of the process for emerging from the crisis.

Before the convening of the forum, a group of some 100 refugees and displaced persons will participate in the Doha negotiations starting 24 June 2010, side by side with the delegations of the JLM and the Government. Following these discussions, the mediators will propose to the parties that they sign a protocol for an agreement on compensation, the voluntary return of displaced persons and their socio-economic reintegration. The launching of the implementation of such a protocol will be a test of the good will of the parties to the conflict to find satisfactory solutions to crucial problems facing the people of Darfur, who have been battered by the war.

Today, despite the very bloody clashes of recent weeks, to which Mr. Gambari has just referred and which constitute a violation of the agreements reached between the JEM and the Government, efforts in favour of peace are palpable. Indeed, the normalization of relations between the Sudan and Chad, and the

general elections that took place on 13 April are factors conducive to the achievement of peace and stability in Darfur.

It is, however, incumbent on the Government of National Unity of the Sudan, in its implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the decisions of the Sudan People's Initiative and within the framework of the Doha peace negotiations, to make significant concessions that will promote the establishment of an environment of genuine security and justice in Darfur, the resolution of land disputes, reparation and compensation for damages caused by the armed conflict, the social reintegration of displaced persons and refugees, socio-economic development, and institutional reforms likely to provide the people of Darfur with the benefits of decentralization and good governance, among others.

The mediators will target their efforts towards a successful conclusion of the peace negotiations in Doha. No effort will be spared to ensure the effective participation of all the armed movements of Darfur in this final phase of negotiations. The time has come to put an end to the crisis in Darfur. I therefore request Council members to encourage the Sudan and Chad to continue improving their relations of good-neighbourliness and trust in order to strengthen security on their joint border with Darfur; to demand that the Government and the JEM immediately cease hostilities and effectively implement article 1 of the Framework Agreement of 23 February 2010; and to encourage all the armed movements of Darfur and the Government to make dialogue the only way to resolve the crisis and to commit firmly to the negotiations process which is under way in Doha.

Finally, the communiqué of the advisory meeting on the Sudan, which was held on 8 May in Addis Ababa, stipulates in paragraph 9 that every effort must be made to ensure that a political agreement on the crisis in Darfur be achieved before the referendum of January 2011. The meeting also underscored the need for the peace process in Darfur to be inclusive and to take into account all issues of concern to the people of Darfur, bearing in mind the progress achieved within the framework of the Doha process, which must continue.

Directly in line with these recommendations, my colleagues Mr. Gambari and Mr. Haile Menkerios and myself have consulted among ourselves and with

President Thabo Mbeki on a coordinated approach to our peace efforts in the Sudan. In this regard, the mediation has drawn up a schedule of negotiations that will enable us to finalize partial protocols and then an inclusive and final agreement as quickly as possible. The agreement, which will be open to all the parties to the conflict, should mark the end of international mediation as a means to resolve the crisis in Darfur and promote ways and means to effectively implement the consensus that will have been achieved with the involvement of civil society.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Mr. Bassolé for his briefing.

I now give the floor to members of the Security Council.

Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom): I would like to take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome this morning to Mr. Mbeki and to thank him for the important work that he is doing in the Sudan. I would also like to thank him, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Menkerios, Joint Special Representative Gambari and Joint Chief Mediator Bassolé for their briefings to the Council this morning.

This is a defining moment for the Sudan and for this Council, with over 30,000 peacekeepers on the ground in Darfur, Abyei, Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Southern Sudan. The Council has more invested in the Sudan than in any other agenda item. There is no greater challenge facing the Security Council over the next 12 months than supporting the parties in securing peace and prosperity for the people of the Sudan.

I would like to focus on three specific themes: the lead-up to the referendum on self-determination for Southern Sudan under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), efforts to support longer-term constructive relations between Northern and Southern Sudan, and the continuing imperative of working to end the conflict in Darfur.

With now less than seven months before the referendum, we should focus on how we can best support the Sudanese parties to ensure a full and peaceful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. We should not prejudge the results of the referendum, but we should be clear that it must take place on time. There must be a credible result beyond dispute. Either outcome — unity or secession — can lead to peaceful and friendly relations between the

North and the South. It is our collective responsibility to do whatever we can to ensure such a peaceful outcome.

Much remains to be done. We must continue to urge both parties to engage in serious and sustained dialogue to reach agreement on the outstanding CPA milestones. These include the urgent establishment of the referendum commissions for Southern Sudan and Abyei, as we have heard from Mr. Menkerios this morning, and a clear focus on the popular consultations in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. We need to see a much greater sense of urgency in preparing for the referendum.

But we must also look beyond the referendum. Northern and Southern Sudan will remain neighbours and essential partners regardless of the outcome of the referendum. We must encourage the parties to approach the issues with a view to their longer-term shared interests. This is not a zero-sum game. They will need to cooperate if they are to have a peaceful, prosperous future, whatever is decided next January.

Our immediate focus should be to encourage dialogue between the parties on the issues and arrangements relating to the post-referendum period and to support this process. In particular, we must encourage the parties as a matter of urgency to agreed demarcation of the North-South border, citizenship rights and arrangements for wealth-sharing, particularly regarding oil. We must also consider what capacity-building support we can provide to Southern Sudan to help it meet its longer-term development and security challenges and to address the severe humanitarian situation. And we should support the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in its planning for what assistance the United Nations might provide after the end of the interim period.

We must not forget that the challenges the Sudan faces are closely linked. It is only by addressing them together that we can ensure a truly stable future for the Sudan's people. So we must continue to focus on Darfur, where more than 2.5 million people remain displaced from their homes by ongoing conflict. And we must also not forget Eastern Sudan, where the humanitarian indicators are some of the worst in the world.

In Darfur, as Mr. Bassolé has said, an inclusive, comprehensive, negotiated agreement that focuses on the causes and consequences of the conflict is the only

route to lasting peace. As we have heard again today from Mr. Gambari about the increase in hostilities across Darfur, we must urge all sides to show their commitment to peace and security by ceasing hostilities and engaging in the Doha process.

We must all — first and foremost the Sudanese parties themselves — step up our engagement to meet the challenges ahead. It is ultimately only the parties themselves who can ensure a peaceful outcome. They must show the political leadership and the vision necessary for this task. This means engaging in serious and sustained dialogue to reach agreement on the issues I have mentioned.

The Security Council has a central role to play. The Council's leadership on the challenges ahead will be critical as we approach the referendum. The Council needs to take a truly strategic approach, looking forward and anticipating the difficult decisions ahead without anticipating any particular referendum outcome. The work of the United Nations missions in the Sudan, both UNMIS and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, will remain vital in supporting the implementation of the CPA, particularly the referendum, and in providing security and protection for civilians in Southern Sudan and Darfur.

As we have heard this morning, the strong engagement of the African Union, and particularly the Sudan's neighbours, will also be critical in securing long-term peace in the Sudan. We commend in particular the leadership of Mr. Mbeki and the work of his Panel, and we look forward to close collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union on the challenges ahead.

Finally, I hope that the presidency will be able to reflect our discussions in some agreed remarks to the press, a draft of which has been circulated to Council members.

Ms. Rice (United States of America): Let me begin by thanking President Thabo Mbeki, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Menkerios, Joint Special Representative Gambari and Joint Chief Mediator Bassolé for their very helpful assessments and briefings to the Council this morning. The United States strongly supports their efforts to address the situation in the Sudan.

I will focus today on three areas: the remaining tasks for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Darfur peace process, and the overwhelming importance of protecting civilians.

With the referendums fast approaching, all parties must redouble their efforts to begin referendum planning for Southern Sudan and Abyei. Referendum commissions must be appointed immediately to begin the difficult work of operational and budget planning, voter registration, education, logistics and administration. This includes resolving the difficult and sensitive issue of who is eligible to vote in Abyei. We must also continue to press the parties to completely demarcate the North-South and Abyei borders, and we must continue to urge them to prepare for popular consultations, which provide a vital outlet for the people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile to express their views on the CPA and their States' relationships with Khartoum.

Progress depends not only on the political will of the parties, but also on support from the international community. We must lay the groundwork now so that we will be prepared to provide as much immediate assistance as possible as conditions on the ground allow. Regardless of the outcomes of the referendums, attention should be paid now to the steps that must be taken to promote a sustainable relationship between the parties to the CPA beyond July 2011. Progress must be made towards reaching agreements on post-referendum wealth-sharing and citizenship, among other issues. The international community stands ready to provide diplomatic and technical support, but the parties themselves must be willing to negotiate in earnest to resolve these difficult issues.

With respect to elections, let me reiterate that the April elections were characterized by serious irregularities, including restrictions on political freedoms, reports of logistical and administrative challenges, harassment and intimidation by security forces and concerns regarding the tabulation process. Thirty-three constituencies still need to conduct or re-run elections, including the Southern Kordofan legislative assembly. Without those elections, Southern Kordofan cannot conduct its popular consultations.

We also remain deeply concerned about the atmosphere of increasing political repression in Khartoum by the Government of the Sudan and the deplorable environment for civil and political rights in the north. This includes the arrest of opposition

leaders, journalists and peaceful demonstrators. There have been reports of restrictions on basic liberties in the south as well. We remind the Governments of Sudan and Southern Sudan that they must honour their international obligations to respect human rights, including freedom of expression, assembly and the press.

We hope for a renewed focus on the Doha peace process and strongly believe that the best way to end conflict and resolve Darfur's marginalization is by finding a comprehensive political solution. The situation in Darfur affects the stability of the region as a whole. We urge the international community to continue to support the negotiation process in Doha, and we reiterate our call on all parties to come to the negotiating table.

Accountability and peace are inextricably bound together. The United States strongly supports international efforts to bring those responsible for genocide and war crimes in Darfur to justice, and we firmly believe that there cannot be a lasting peace in Darfur without accountability and justice. So, we call again on the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its Prosecutor, as required by Security Council resolution 1593 (2005).

The Council heard a disturbing briefing from ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo on Friday (see S/PV.6337). It is clearer than ever that the Government of Sudan continues to violate the Council's resolutions, including its obligation to cooperate with the ICC under resolution 1593 (2005). We are deeply concerned by the 25 May Pre-Trial Chamber decision informing the Council of the Government of Sudan's failure to cooperate with the Court.

We call again on the Government of Sudan and all parties to the conflict to cooperate fully with the ICC and its Prosecutor, as clearly required by resolution 1593 (2005). Moreover, we urge all States, including those not party to the Rome Statute, to refrain from providing political or financial support to Sudanese suspects indicted by the ICC.

We have repeatedly emphasized and will continue to emphasize the need to place the highest priority on the protection of civilians. We are gravely concerned by the continuing insecurity and violence faced by the civilian population in Sudan. In particular, we are deeply disturbed by the recent large-scale offensive of

the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Justice and Equality Movement in Darfur. The Government of Sudan continues to conduct aerial bombardments in Darfur. These actions kill and maim civilians and result in the additional displacement of innocent Darfuris.

We are also deeply concerned about continued violence in the south, including intercommunal violence and attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army. Since last January, 440,000 people have been displaced in the south. The United States further deplores the continued attacks on the personnel of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the Government of Sudan's continued obstruction of access to UNAMID and other humanitarian actors, which hinders independent monitoring in Darfur.

Despite direct attacks on its peacekeepers, UNAMID has played an essential role in ensuring security for humanitarian assistance providers in Sudan. But security is the primary responsibility of the Government of Sudan. It must make increased efforts to bring those who attack civilians and peacekeepers to justice. It is important that the Government of Sudan provide unfettered access for UNAMID. Neither UNAMID nor humanitarian organizations have had adequate access to areas of continued conflict in Darfur. With the lives of more innocent civilians at stake, that is unconscionable and unacceptable.

It is also important to redouble efforts to end the sexual violence that plagues Darfur. During the recent fighting in Jebel Marra, UNAMID documented nine cases of such violence, including rape, attempted rape and assault. That is part of a trend that has continued for far too long. It must end. The Government of Sudan, UNAMID and other United Nations entities, as well as the non-governmental organization community, must strengthen prevention and tools to respond to sexual and gender-based violence. We urge UNAMID to increase its reporting on sexual and gender-based violence to the Council and call on the Government of Sudan to ensure that such crimes are investigated and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.

We urge UNAMID and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan also to utilize the full extent of their mandates and capabilities to protect civilians in danger. In Darfur, accelerating the training for community police services for the internally displaced in camps and those voluntarily returning to their

villages of origin would help promote peace and security.

In the south, we urge the Government of Southern Sudan to develop a security framework ahead of the referendum and to ensure that its capacity exists to protect its own population. UNMIS must also increase efforts to ensure that civilians are protected from violence. Finally, we urge the Governments of Sudan and Southern Sudan, and all others, to lift any and all restrictions on the activities and movements of UNMIS.

We have less than seven months until the referendums, and there is still much work to be done. But the United States remains hopeful that, with the necessary political will of the parties and with adequate international support, the referendums can be conducted peacefully and successfully.

Mr. Salam (Lebanon) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to welcome President Mbeki and to express my deep appreciation for his wise efforts. I also welcome Mr. Menkerios, Mr. Bassolé and Mr. Gambari and congratulate them on their efforts on behalf of the Sudan. I thank them for their valuable briefings.

The idea of this unusual meeting emerged during Security Council consultations on 11 February, when members expressed their wish to hold a in-depth discussion of the situation in the Sudan with the two mediators, President Mbeki and Mr. Bassolé, and the two Special Representatives, Mr. Gambari and Mr. Menkerios, in order to consider what can be done to help that large country address its challenges and overcome its crises and to reflect on what the United Nations can do in that regard.

We express our deep appreciation for the convening of today's meeting and for the goodwill that we perceive in support for the Sudan in meeting the historic challenges that it faces today. We hope that our efforts will be successful so as to benefit that country, and consequently the entire region and the African continent.

When we look at a number of issues before us — such as the monitoring of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the referendum in the South and its aftermath, the demarcation of the Abyei borders, the question of the wealth-sharing, the situation in Darfur, the humanitarian situation and the

displaced population — we see that the only option is to support the path towards peace based on political dialogue as the best way to settle the conflict in the Sudan, to establish peace and stability and to address all problems.

Five years after its signing, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has proved both its effectiveness and the need for a thorough follow-up on the implementation of all its provisions. It would have been impossible to achieve any of these steps without the political will and determination of the Sudanese Government of National Unity and all other concerned parties.

As Council Members know, this meeting is being held only a few months before the scheduled referendum on the fate of the South, and thus at a very important stage in the history of the Sudan. In this context, Lebanon would like to emphasize the importance of the following points.

First, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Sudan must be respected.

Second, the success of the multi-level electoral process, which took place between 11 and 15 April, should be commended, despite its shortcomings, and considered an important step in guaranteeing the stability and sustainability of the implementation of all the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Third, we call for continued efforts to guarantee the successful implementation of the referendum on the fate of the South, and we emphasize the importance of making unity an attractive option, in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Fourth, we support the negotiations for the post-referendum stage, regardless of the outcome of the referendum.

Fifth, we welcome the improved relations between the Sudan and Chad and the establishment of joint forces to monitor their common borders.

Sixth, we support efforts to achieve a comprehensive, final and peaceful solution in Darfur, and we commend the State of Qatar and its Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani for hosting the peace negotiations in Doha. We call upon all factions to return to the negotiating table and to resolve all disputed matters through dialogue. We call upon those

States with influence to exert pressure on the remaining parties to join the negotiations.

Seventh, we caution against the danger of politicization and double standards in the work of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and we recall the substance of the resolutions of the League of Arab States rejecting the ICC decisions against President Omer Hassan Al-Bashir.

It goes without saying that political efforts should be accompanied by a social and economic plan to contribute to addressing the root causes of the crisis and the reconstruction of the Sudan.

In conclusion, we emphasize the importance of the ongoing cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, and call on the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League, the African Union and the Non-Aligned Movement to continue their essential coordination role in order to achieve peace and stability in the Sudan.

Mr. Issouze-Ngondet (Gabon) (*spoke in French*): I should like to thank you, Sir, for having organized this special meeting on the Sudan — a matter at the very heart of Gabon's concerns.

I should like to welcome the presence among us of President Mbeki, Djibril Bassolé, Ibrahim Gambari and Haile Menkerios and, of course, to thank them for their very enlightening briefings on the various aspects of the crisis in the Sudan. The briefings were particularly useful in presenting a holistic perspective on the Sudanese crisis and in clearly illustrating realities on the ground and the options under consideration for supporting the peace process in the Sudan. I welcome their ongoing efforts alongside the United Nations and the African Union to help the Sudanese people to return to the path to peace and stability. I reiterate, of course, the support of Gabon for their activities.

I appreciate the Ambassador of Lebanon's reminder of the context in which the Council wished to hold this meeting and the objectives envisaged for it. In the light of the relevant information that the briefers have just conveyed to us, three fundamental concerns need to be raised: the coordination of the activities of the international community with a view to achieving a holistic approach; the organization of the referendum in the best possible conditions; and the options under

consideration for effectively managing post-referendum challenges.

In addressing the first of these points, Gabon wishes to reaffirm its support for the peace process in Darfur and Southern Sudan. The Darfur Peace Agreement must be fully implemented. The Doha agreements of February and March 2010, signed, respectively, with the Justice and Equality Movement and the Justice and Liberation Movement, should encourage other rebel groups to join the peace process. We encourage the Sudanese Government to continue along this path. We call on those armed groups that have not yet done so to join the peace process under way in order to guarantee a lasting peace for the populations continue to pay a heavy price.

We are particularly pleased with the evolution in the discussions under way aimed at the conclusion of a comprehensive peace agreement for Darfur. We commend the commitment of the Sudanese Government in this context. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Southern Sudan must be implemented to its full extent. Everything must be done to ensure that the referendum of January 2011 takes place in the best possible conditions and that its outcome, whichever option is chosen, will be a stabilizing factor. We remain convinced that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is an inclusive political tool essential to resolving the crisis in Southern Sudan and achieving lasting peace in the country.

We should like to reiterate our support for the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). We welcome the progress achieved in the deployment of UNAMID and the efforts of the contributing countries — Nepal, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Tanzania — that have made these results possible. We also welcome the efforts of the Sudanese Government, whose cooperation has facilitated this evolution towards a slightly more secure and stable environment in Darfur. We reiterate our support for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, whose efforts to protect the civilian population and to secure humanitarian assistance play an effective role in the peace process.

All these activities must be coordinated, and we welcome the statements of various actors expressing their total satisfaction with the cooperation of a number of parties to ensure that the process achieves positive results. We invite the United Nations, the African

Union and all the other actors of the international community to maintain these coordination efforts and to ensure that the action being carried out in the context of the peace process is integrated and leads to the establishment of lasting peace in Southern Sudan.

I shall now turn to my second point, the organization of the referendum. Gabon is following the process under way with the keenest attention, and urges the United Nations, the Sudanese Government and the Government of Southern Sudan to do all they can to ensure that the referendum takes place in a peaceful climate. We believe that the assistance of the United Nations will be more than decisive, and in that respect we firmly support the efforts being made by Mr. Menkerios. We invite him to continue his consultations with the African Union and the countries of the region. We are convinced that the support of countries of the region and of the African Union will help to strengthen the credibility of the process.

I should like to draw the attention of Council members to my third point, which relates to the post-referendum challenges. I mention the various post-referendum challenges with the aim of focusing the actors involved in the peace processes in Southern Sudan and in Darfur, as well as Council members, on possible post-referendum scenarios and their long-term implications.

The referendum, as we are all well aware, presents us two options. The first is that Southern Sudan would remain part of the Sudanese State — a result that would consolidate the unifying approach strongly advocated by the African Union, which remains committed to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan. But it must also be born in mind that, in that approach, the United Nations will continue to play a role just as important as that it plays today. But we will have to consider redefining the United Nations role in helping to develop peaceful relations between Khartoum and Juba in that context, and I would invite the Council to consider that matter.

The second option is independence for Southern Sudan, which poses very considerable challenges including recognition of the new State, the establishment of harmonious diplomatic relations with Khartoum, demarcation of the North-South border, wealth-sharing and the effects of this option on Darfur and on eastern Sudan. All those challenges remind us of the need to maintain the United Nations presence in

the Sudan so that it can play its important peacemaking role. Beyond those challenges there is the future of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan. If this option is considered, the Mission's context could change, and we must look at its mandate and role in that context.

In any event, I invite the Security Council and the various actors, without prejudging the outcome of the referendum, to bear in mind the need for an international mechanism that could help in managing all of those challenges, as well as the need for strengthening close, peaceful relations between Khartoum and Juba.

Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We welcome the participation in today's meeting of Mr. Mbeki, Chairperson of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur, Special Representatives Gambari and Menkerios and Joint Chief Mediator Bassolé. We thank them for sharing their assessments of the situation.

The Sudan is passing through a decisive stage in its history. Success will be crucial for regional peace and stability. Our discussion reaffirms the need for a comprehensive approach to the peace process in the Sudan. Full implementation by the Sudanese parties, with the active assistance of the international community, of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) remains the irreplaceable basis for a Sudanese settlement. The Sudan's recent general elections marked an important stage in the implementation of the Agreement.

We welcome the agreement between the parties on the establishment of a bilateral mechanism to discuss disputed issues within the framework of preparations for the January 2011 referendum. Here, the role of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) should be to assist the parties in resolving their differences on the main elements of a settlement. In our view, a priority for the international community is to help create the conditions conducive to the holding of the referendum in Southern Sudan and Abyei.

The situation in Southern Sudan is a matter of concern, with grave security problems and a humanitarian crisis. Nearly 40 per cent of the population of the South needs food aid, and almost 1.5 million people are threatened by hunger. In that context, UNMIS should continue to carry out the strategy of protecting the civilian population, including

expanded patrols in problematic areas of Southern Sudan. Monitoring the process of disarming the civilian population is another responsibility along with helping to set up local mechanisms for resolving tribal disputes. But it is obvious that the main responsibility for remedying the situation lies with the Southern Sudanese authorities.

The only viable formula for resolving the problem of Darfur remains the parties' conclusion of the necessary political agreements. The most pressing task is to put in place a robust regime in Darfur to put an end to armed activities, along with mechanisms to monitor it.

The process of negotiations between the Government and rebel groups is making only sporadic progress. The international community must support the position of the Government of the Sudan, in order to rapidly achieve a comprehensive agreement to settle the Darfur conflict, and it must urge the leaders of rebel groups to resume their participation in the political dialogue, without preconditions. In our view, the rebels' approach of using various pretexts to block the Darfur negotiating process — which is under the auspices of the Joint Chief Mediator and with the assistance of Qatar — is unacceptable. The international community should condemn the destructive activities of armed groups in Darfur, which is reflected, *inter alia*, by the rebels' refusal to provide peacekeepers of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and humanitarian organizations with access to areas under their control and by their attempts to expand those areas. We strongly welcome UNAMID's activities and its important stabilizing role.

Settlement of the Darfur conflict is being promoted by the normalization of relations between the Sudan and Chad, which should be consolidated and supported. It is in keeping with the interests of the entire subregion.

The coming period will determine the future of the Sudan. The task of making unity attractive to the population of Southern Sudan remains a priority. We view as unacceptable all outside attempts to impose on the parties formulas for the future status of the Sudan. That fateful decision should be made solely by the Sudanese themselves.

There is a need to ensure a coherent approach by the international community to resolving Sudanese

issues. Only in that way can we make progress towards a settlement. The Sudan peace process should be based on constructive, even-handed dialogue between the international community and the Government of the country, respecting the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Mr. Araud (France) (*spoke in French*): I wish on behalf of France, I thank you, Mr. President, and the United Kingdom for having made possible this discussion on the Sudan and for having invited President Mbeki, Mr. Menkerios, Mr. Gambari and Mr. Bassolé to participate. I thank them for being with us today.

As all previous speakers have said, the coming period is crucial for the Sudan and its people. We must be united, which means that all international community actors must work together, first and foremost of course the United Nations and the African Union. Thanks to the joint United Nations-African Union forum set up following the Addis Ababa meeting on 8 May, structured and continuous coordination between the two organizations on all Sudan issues will now be possible, in particular on the referendum. We must take full advantage of this, in line with the principles of the United Nations Charter and Security Council resolutions.

Being united also means ensuring coherent action by the representatives of the international community. As the African Union High-Level Panel reports, we cannot isolate the Sudan conflicts: they are all interlinked.

And we must be vigilant. As the Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation period comes to an end, we must ensure, in accordance with resolution 1919 (2010), that all stages leading to the January 2011 self-determination referendum can be completed. First of all, the Government of the Sudan must meet its own commitments. In the immediate future, the Referendum Commissions, which are key in organizing next January's poll, must be established. France and the European Union are prepared to provide technical and financial support in organizing the referendum. The deployment of European Union observers could also help to make the process more transparent.

In the run-up to the referendum, the parties must also make significant progress in settling outstanding post-referendum issues, which, as already noted, include demarcating the borders, clarifying the

modalities for wealth-sharing and resolving citizenship issues. Postponing those questions will only raise questions about the credibility of the referendum.

The United Nations must also help in this process, both with logistical support for meeting deadlines and by making its expertise available to the parties. Here, we expect that the Secretariat will play an active role in supporting the parties. The Security Council should remain vigilant in the coming months, given the high stakes involved. France therefore calls for the Council to be given regular briefings and presentations on the progress in the preparations for the referendum.

Of course, the support of the United Nations should continue after the poll to implement the decision that the people of Southern Sudan will take. To that end, we have already called on the Secretariat to consider modalities for a United Nations presence following the interim period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This issue has already been properly raised by my colleague from Gabon.

Beyond that political support, the United Nations should monitor the humanitarian situation in the Sudan. In particular, given the reported deterioration of the humanitarian situation, the international community should consider how it can bolster its support for the development of Southern Sudan. The Council could consider that issue in the coming weeks.

Turning now to Darfur, it is essential that all parties participate in good faith in the negotiations led by Joint Mediator Bassolé and the State of Qatar. We encourage the African Union to continue its efforts to pursue this political process.

A first stage has been initiated by the Justice and Equality Movement and the Liberation and Justice Movement with the signing of framework agreements with the Sudanese Government. Those agreements should be implemented as soon as possible. All elements of the Movement for the Liberation of the Sudan should join the process. It is unacceptable for the Movement to remain outside the peace efforts.

With regard to the situation on the ground, we must not accept that the free movement of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan and of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) should be impaired by Sudanese authorities and rebel groups. The Missions should be

able to ensure the protection of civilian populations and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance everywhere and without exception. In that regard, we are concerned about the issue of access to humanitarian assistance in camps in Darfur. We would like to have more detailed information in that regard, as well as in connection with the efforts of UNAMID to correct the situation.

Lastly, we should promote justice in the Sudan. We recently met with Mr. Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, whose briefing was damning (see S/PV.6336). We cannot expect there to be peace and stability without justice and without combating impunity. France supports international criminal justice, and we reiterate Sudan's obligation to cooperate, pursuant to resolution 1593 (2005). In that regard, we are concerned about the Court's new report to the Security Council underscoring the lack of cooperation by the Sudan (see S/2010/265). We should follow up that communication. We cannot remain silent. Moreover, international criminal justice to judge the most serious crimes should go hand in hand with the strengthening of the Sudanese justice system. That system too must commit itself resolutely to combating impunity and to developing a mechanism for reconciliation at the local level.

In conclusion, I would like again to say that France is prepared to participate in the joint efforts to be taken so that the coming deadlines in the Sudan provide an opportunity to bolster the stability of the region and to put an end to the suffering of populations, which has continued for far too long.

Mr. Rugunda (Uganda): I wish to thank His Excellency Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Chairperson of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Darfur, for his briefing and for the Panel's highly commendable work. I also thank Mr. Gambari, Joint Special Representative for Darfur and head of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID); Mr. Menkerios, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS); and Mr. Bassolé, the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator, for their commendable work and for their briefings on the situation in the Sudan.

Uganda welcomes the progress that has been made towards peace and stability in the Sudan. The recently concluded national elections, the ongoing

implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and efforts to resolve the Darfur conflict through the Doha peace process are significant developments. We salute the good work by the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel and we welcome the progress being made through a widely consultative and inclusive approach. We also commend UNAMID and UNMIS, under the leadership of Mr. Gambari and Mr. Menkerios respectively, for the contributions they are making to resolving the issues in the Sudan.

My delegation welcomes the commitment expressed by the Government of the Sudan to work jointly with the Panel on all steps to be taken towards advancing peace, justice and reconciliation. Furthermore, we welcome the commitment by the Government to agree to a joint implementation and monitoring mechanism, both on Darfur and on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

While we commend the progress made, we must acknowledge that the Sudan is entering a critical stage. There are still key outstanding issues that need to be addressed to ensure the restoration of peace in Darfur, the full implementation of the CPA and agreement on post-referendum arrangements. We are concerned about the recent upsurge of incidents of violence in Darfur. We call upon the parties to respect the ceasefire and to commit themselves to the peaceful resolution of the conflict through the Doha peace process.

It is important to ensure the full and timely implementation of the CPA. We call upon the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to adhere to the timelines for the remaining tasks. The holding of the recent national elections, in spite of their shortcomings, attests to progress towards democratic transformation in the Sudan.

Given the fact that, according to the CPA, the referendum in Southern Sudan should be held by 9 January 2011, there is an urgent need to expedite the establishment and operationalization of the Referendum Commission and the demarcation of the north-south border and of the Abyei border. It is therefore critical that the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the United Nations and the wider international community render greater support towards accomplishment of the remaining tasks. That will entail UNMIS, among

others, providing technical and logistical support to the Referendum Commission to ensure that the referendum is held as scheduled and that it is free, fair, transparent and credible.

Finally, it is incumbent upon the leadership of the NCP and the SPLM, as parties to the CPA, to maintain their political goodwill and commitment to the full and timely implementation of the CPA.

Uganda supports the elements of the President's remarks to the press prepared by the delegation of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Onemola (Nigeria): I would like to thank President Mbeki, Ambassador Gambari, Mr. Menkerios and Mr. Bassolé for their very useful briefings this morning on the situation in the Sudan. They have not only provided useful insights, but also given us a comprehensive picture of the interlocking dimensions of the challenges that lie ahead in the country. I commend them for their individual and collective efforts in the Sudan. The Council is now better informed on what needs to be done in the next 12 months, especially.

The Sudan is at a critical juncture. With the elections of April over, the business of inclusive governance, starting with the formation of a Government of national unity, must gather momentum in order to translate lofty promises into concrete results. It is therefore important for the Government of the Sudan and all political leaders to press forward with the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Dialogue rather than force is the key to solving the Sudan's problems. Accordingly, we call on all parties to adhere and recommit to the CPA.

The 2011 referendum is a central pillar of the CPA. Its organization and outcome will have far-reaching implications. It is therefore important that preparations for the referendum be inclusive, transparent, forward-looking and thorough. The international community, in particular the Security Council, should support the processes leading to the referendum. In this regard, the security challenge in the Sudan referred to by both Mr. Menkerios and Ambassador Gambari must be given adequate attention. Neither the Government of the Sudan nor the African Union acting alone can meet the security needs in the Sudan. It will take a global effort to cope with the situation. The Security Council, with its primary

responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, has a key role to play.

Support for and progress in the Doha peace process will go a long way towards creating stability in the Sudan, and more especially Darfur. The deep mistrust that exists among the parties impedes progress. We therefore call on the parties to engage constructively and meaningfully in the peace process.

The continued presence of the United Nations through the United Nations Mission in the Sudan and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur is a necessary complement to the peace process. It is important, however, for the United Nations to integrate its peace and security efforts with robust development assistance in Darfur. The real dividends of peace will be felt when recovery, reconstruction and development take place in tandem. Otherwise, the goal of integration through the voluntary return of internally displaced persons may remain elusive.

For the United Nations, success in the Sudan will depend on the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of funding. This issue was well articulated in the Prodi report (see A/63/666) and should be acted upon. Of equal significance is the need to look beyond the Multi-Donor Trust Fund as a means of supporting African Union peacekeeping capacity. The African Union lacks the capacity to undertake single-handed the wide range of activities associated with early warning, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in the conflict zones dotted throughout Africa. I hope that our consultations today will help in this direction.

Mr. Apakan (Turkey): I would like begin my remarks by welcoming all the esteemed dignitaries — President Mbeki, Mr. Gambari, Mr. Menkerios and Mr. Bassolé — who have briefed the Council today. We appreciate their hard work and thank them for sharing their valuable insights and recommendations with us.

The Sudan is at a crossroads, not only geographically but also politically. How developments unfold in the months ahead will have implications far and wide. The United Nations and the international community have invested heavily in bringing peace to the Sudan, and that effort has yielded significant dividends. Important progress has been made with the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and such crucial milestones as the Abyei decision and the recent national and presidential

elections have been met. The Sudan and Chad have normalized their relations and, in Darfur, a political process has been set in motion, with specific mechanisms to address outstanding issues.

All these efforts in the right direction notwithstanding, it is also clear that, be it in Darfur or Southern Sudan, the situation overall remains fragile and volatile. Armed clashes and widespread violence are perpetuating insecurity, which in turn is driving displacement and criminality. Much remains to be done to achieve a stable state of security.

Turkey is committed to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan. On the other hand, Turkey has lent its full support to the CPA since its inception. In the coming months, the body politic in the Sudan and the Council's attention will focus largely on ensuring the full implementation of the CPA and on addressing post-referendum arrangements. In that context, we believe that the United Nations will continue to have a central role to play not only in helping to build mutual trust and confidence between the parties, but also in assisting them in their negotiations and giving support, if requested, for the referendums and popular consultation processes. The United Nations continued presence after the referendums will also be vital in helping the Sudan to move forward.

On the other hand, while they are not comparable, it is clear that CPA implementation, peace and peace efforts in Darfur are separate but not separable processes. Stagnation in one invariably impedes progress in the other. Therefore, while there is no direct linkage, every effort should be made to create a mutually reinforcing and positive relationship between the CPA and the Doha peace process.

As concerns Darfur, the Doha process is vital, since security cannot realistically be attained in the absence of a comprehensive political settlement. International pressure must be applied on rebel groups to participate constructively in Doha. They must not be allowed to bide their time and hedge their bets on the possibility of the CPA's unravelling. A clear pronouncement to rebel groups that the Doha peace process is not an open-ended one and that there is no alternative to peace talks would be useful.

Be it with regard to the CPA or the Doha process, it is also crucial to ensure that, in tandem with restoring mutual trust and confidence, the right

incentives remain in place. In Doha, the parties must be able to perceive win-win situations where their genuine grievances and rational expectations are being duly met with meaningful and fair compromise package solutions. In the context of the CPA, both parties need to understand that, regardless of the results of the referendums and popular consultations, they are bound to live together. This interdependence is a reality that has, unfortunately, been drawn out by simplistic interpretations of the CPA. It is counterproductive to present the potential outcome of the referendum in the South as a foregone conclusion. Both sides must be allowed to make their case, as envisaged in the CPA. In this vein, it must be made clear once again that the referendum in the South does not imply finality, but is part of a larger process that has to be managed very carefully.

In that connection, as my British colleague mentioned, the leadership of the Council has a strategic context, and we must make sure that the United Nations involvement in the Sudan is not in any way seen to prejudice the outcome of the referendum.

Meanwhile, whether they are ensured by the United Nations, the Government of the Sudan or the Government of Southern Sudan, the protection of civilians and humanitarian assistance should be given the highest priority. In taking the process forward, continuing to cultivate national ownership of the problems at hand, including at the grass-roots level, will also be crucial since, ultimately, whether in Darfur or with regard to the CPA, genuine solutions to existing problems can be found only by the Sudanese themselves.

Finally, it will be important to effectively take into consideration the many regional dynamics in play. Successfully incorporating regional approaches and addressing concerns, whether of neighbours or organizations such as the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, into the solutions that are being worked on in the Sudan will help prevent larger problems from emerging later in the process. In this regard, Turkey continues to believe that the report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur is, as a whole, extremely important. That report, in particular in its findings and recommendations, constitutes a point of reference for all parties in the conflict in the Sudan. Based on the report, continued active leadership on the part of the African Union

High-Level Implementation Panel will be vital to ensuring peace and stability in the Sudan.

I will conclude by making the observation that the CPA has been supported by the international community because it has brought peace to the Sudan. The true test for the CPA and the parties will be about not whether a specific outcome is reached in the referendum, but whether peace can be sustained. That, of course, will largely depend on the choices that the parties to the CPA will make. Those choices will also shape the response of the international community to developments in 2011.

The United Nations and the Security Council, together with the international community, must ensure that the choices made now are those that favour peace, stability, harmony and prosperity through compromise, mutual respect and understanding. The Council and the international community should ensure the full implementation of the CPA while also demonstrating political wisdom, foresight and flexibility when the greater good requires it. Ultimately, the goal is to provide a framework through which the peaceful coexistence of North and South can be assured in the long term, in whatever shape or form it best suits the hopes of the Sudanese people.

Mr. Takasu (Japan): I would like to thank President Mbeki, Mr. Menkerios, Mr. Gambari and Mr. Bassolé for their insightful briefings. It is a rare and valuable opportunity for the Council to be briefed by the four main players collectively working for peace in the Sudan. Today's briefings showed clearly that each speaker, within his mandate and capacity, is contributing greatly, and in a complementary manner, to the achievement of peace and security in the Sudan and the region as a whole. I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to their invaluable work, and also to all United Nations personnel working there under difficult conditions.

The Sudanese parties concerned have made a strenuous effort to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) since 2005, despite the many difficulties they have encountered. Japan would like to commend the efforts of all Sudanese parties and international entities involved. The appointment of the members of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission is testimony to those efforts. The primary mover bringing about peace in the Sudan must be the Sudanese people themselves. The United Nations, the

African Union and the international community as a whole fulfil a supporting role by assisting the national efforts of the people of the Sudan.

The referendum to be held in January of next year is the culmination of the implementation of the CPA, and we should provide every possible support to make it a success. We also support the agreement of the CPA parties and encourage them to engage in discussion on their own of post-referendum arrangements. If it is requested and deemed necessary, we hope very much that President Mbeki will play a role as mediator between the parties. We put our trust in his wisdom and guidance.

It is vitally important that the parties concerned accept and respect the outcome of the referendum, regardless of the result, and we urge the CPA parties and the international community to maintain and promote constructive relations. Based on this principle, I wish to encourage Sudan's neighbouring countries, and the African Union in particular, to support the people of the Sudan for the stability of that country.

It is also important to start exploring the future role of the United Nations, in close coordination with the parties concerned. Trust and confidence between North and South must be promoted to serve their mutual interests. In so doing, it is of key importance to examine the issues, outlined by the CPA parties, of security along the North-South border, oil and pipelines, citizenship and freedom of movement. A framework must be established for populations near the border to discuss common problems openly and to promote regular dialogue. Japan attaches particular priority to the development of human resources in the North and South through training and the creation of employment. We urge the international community to accelerate its efforts to provide support in this area.

There is a consensus on the importance of achieving comprehensive peace in Darfur. The resumption of the Doha peace process is welcome, thanks to efforts led by Mr. Bassolé and Foreign Minister Al-Mahmoud of Qatar. I wish to reiterate his appeal to all parties — the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and others — to engage actively in this process. Dialogue should also continue with Mr. Minnawi's group concerning the signing of a peace agreement with the Government. I am confident that

Mr. Gambari will do his best to promote dialogue for peace at the grass-roots level.

We are deeply concerned with the deteriorating security situation in Darfur. The JEM is increasing its military offensive operations and expanding its area of activity beyond Darfur. One of the causes is the proliferation of small arms in Darfur and in the South. We must act now to enforce the arms embargo and other sanctions measures by promoting advocacy and working with civil society organizations. The future stability of the Sudan depends on achieving a lasting peace in Darfur and constructive relations between the North and the South. Every representative here today is playing an important role in achieving the common goal of realizing peace, security and development in the Sudan. Their close coordination and cooperation with each other is essential.

I would like to conclude by reiterating Japan's strong commitment to sustainable peace and prosperity in the Sudan.

Mrs. Viotti (Brazil): Let me start by joining earlier speakers in extending a warm welcome to President Thabo Mbeki. Brazil commends his leadership and the excellent work of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel. I thank Special Representatives Ibrahim Gambari and Haile Menkerios and Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassolé for their statements. More importantly, we commend them for their invaluable work.

This meeting reflects and consolidates the relatively new integrated approach the United Nations has been taking to Sudanese affairs. Such an approach is imperative, since the various Sudanese crises are all merely different manifestations of the tension between centre and periphery in the Sudan, political, economic or cultural. Today's briefing also celebrates the fruitful partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, combining the Charter-based authority of the Security Council with the African Union's extensive knowledge of the political and cultural context in which African conflicts occur, and Africans' determination to play an active and constructive role in the resolution of such conflicts. In Sudan, in particular, that partnership is indispensable, given the importance of the country's affairs not only to its immediate vicinity, but also to the continent as a whole.

This meeting is also an effort by the Security Council to be ahead of events and engage in truly

preventive diplomacy. My delegation encourages the Council to conduct similar exercises with respect to other issues on its agenda that require the same kind of forward-looking attitude.

I would like to make brief comments on a few aspects of the issue at hand. On Sudan as a whole, we attach great importance to the coordination of the various international actors involved. If international action is to be fully effective, not only do we have to deal with Sudan in a holistic manner, but we also need to ensure that multilateral and regional organizations, peacekeeping missions, mediation teams, special envoys, donors and other stakeholders move in the same direction and support each other. For that to happen, we must rely on adequate coordination mechanisms.

The well-coordinated support of the international community was crucial to the positive outcome of the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Its full implementation will require the same unity of purpose, in particular to assist the parties to overcome their differences and mutual distrust. That is key not only to help them make the difficult decisions that still lie ahead, but also to build productive and cooperative relations after the referendum. The meetings held in Addis Ababa in early May, particularly the consultative meeting of 8 May, were positive steps in the right direction. The challenge now is to ensure that those initiatives are focused and effective and that they receive the proper follow-up.

Another aspect of utmost importance is ensuring that the referendums are not only fair and credible but are also perceived as such by the parties and the population. To that end, no efforts should be spared in appropriate preparation. The United Nations must be ready to assist the parties, at their request, in whatever they need, including in the determination of the modalities for the holding of the referendums and popular consultations.

Assistance must also be provided, as requested by the parties, to facilitate arrangements on wealth-sharing, power-sharing, citizenship rights, borders and currency, among other sensitive issues, irrespective of the outcome of the southern referendum. Needless to say, such assistance must be rigorously consistent with the CPA and must in no way prejudice or influence the results of the referendums and popular consultations.

The strict impartiality of the United Nations is the political sine qua non condition of this necessary exercise in preventive diplomacy.

The wide acceptance of the results of the southern referendum and its timely implementation will also depend on the prevalence of an environment that is at least minimally peaceful. To that end, it will be important to intensify current efforts to address the immediate challenges posed by food insecurity, intertribal clashes and fragile security institutions. The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and bilateral and multilateral donors have a particularly relevant role to play in that regard. A modicum of stability will also be needed in the aftermath of the referendum.

This means that the United Nations presence in Sudan will likely be required beyond the transitional period established by the CPA in order to help maintain peace, provide security and implement the outcome of the referendum, whatever it might be. Such a presence would need to rely extensively on the human and material resources currently available to UNMIS. Given the time required by the United Nations to mobilize and deploy resources to the field, it is important that the Secretariat develop very solid contingency plans and, if necessary, submit to Member States, as appropriate, a full assessment of the Mission's further needs. The Security Council should also begin to reflect on the possible role that the Peacebuilding Commission might play in both the unity and secession scenarios.

Finally, I wish to say a few words regarding Darfur. Reaching a peace agreement before January 2011 is very important. If that proves impossible, at least a stable ceasefire seems necessary. We fully support efforts by the Mediation to stimulate the unified representation of all rebel movements. Appropriate enforcement of the arms embargo is also key. We also support measures taken to secure ample participation of Darfurian civil society in the search for peace. In that regard, we welcome the announcement, during President Mbeki's visit to Khartoum last week, of the holding of the Darfur-Darfur conference. My delegation hopes that the participants in the initiative will discuss the issues of guaranteeing political representation to the groups excluded from last April's elections.

Fully implementing the CPA and ending the Darfur conflict are formidable challenges. If we are successful there, we will have gone a long way towards helping bring enduring peace and long-term stability to the whole African continent. We cannot but succeed.

Mr. Mayr-Harting (Austria): I would first like to welcome President Thabo Mbeki, Chairperson of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur, Mr. Haile Menkerios, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan, Mr. Ibrahim Gambari, Joint African Union-United Nations Special Representative for Darfur, and Mr. Djibril Bassolé, Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur, and to thank them for their presence here today and for their presentations. Let me commend them and their staffs for their tireless efforts. This high-level presence is a strong signal of our common commitment to work with the Sudanese people in addressing the challenges they face. Today's meeting is also an important symbol of collaboration between the African Union and the United Nations. We thank the United Kingdom and Lebanon for this important initiative.

The year 2010 is a crucial one for the Sudan. When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, the two parties pledged to do their utmost to make unity attractive. The CPA provides that the people of Southern Sudan can choose unity or secession in a referendum in January 2011. We expect both parties to fulfil their commitments to implement the CPA, which includes undertaking a credible referendum and abiding by its outcome.

This will also be a major challenge for the African Union and, in a complementary way, for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. It will be important that they establish and maintain smooth working relations with both sides and that we extend full support to these efforts.

Without prejudging the outcome of the referendum, the international community has to step up support and diplomatic efforts in the run-up to it. Lessons learned from the election process have to be applied. The outstanding issues in the implementation of the CPA have to be resolved by the parties. These include preparation of the two referendums and public consultations, Abyei, wealth-sharing, oil-sharing and border demarcation. Contingency planning will logically also have to include the scenario of a vote in

favour of the independence of Southern Sudan and support good governance under all possible outcomes.

We must work to avert conflict, protect lives and ensure regional stability. The protection and security of civilians has to be fully guaranteed under all circumstances. In those regards, support by the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) is important, and I appreciate what Special Representative Menkerios told us today about the efforts of UNMIS to develop a mission-wide protection strategy.

Austria is concerned about the recent rise in violence in Southern Sudan. While the main responsibility for containing this violence and curbing the proliferation of weapons lies with the Government of Southern Sudan, the international community needs to increase its support, including through effective security sector reform.

While CPA implementation and referendum and post-referendum planning are of the utmost urgency, we must not lose sight of simultaneously coordinating initiatives to address the conflict in Darfur. Major progress has been achieved in the improvement of relations between Sudan and Chad. However, the security situation in Darfur, as others have already said, has recently worsened, with the highest number of casualties having been logged in the month of May since the inception of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Recent fighting between rebel and Government forces has overshadowed progress in the Darfur peace talks in Doha. We urge all parties to refrain from hostilities and to fulfil their obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law. The solution of the Darfur crisis can only be peaceful, and all parties must join the peace process.

We strongly support the efforts of both the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur, Mr. Djibril Bassolé, and Joint Special Representative for the African Union and UNAMID, Mr. Ibrahim Gambari. At the same time, the international community cannot wait for a peace agreement in Doha in order to take action to stabilize and improve the living conditions of the people of Darfur. We must reach consensus on moving forward with an approach that complements the Doha efforts on the ground to improve security and stabilize communities with meaningful development. There needs to be a transition from emergency relief to early

recovery. We must work for durable solutions, and Austria supports a role for UNAMID in this regard.

We should also not forget about Sudanese refugees in Chad. Options for their safe and voluntary return must be explored, and they must have a stake in the peace process. Weak rule of law and human rights institutions contribute to significant gaps in the protection of civilians. Violence against civilians, especially women, remains unaddressed and the perpetrators go unpunished. These shortcomings must be urgently addressed in a comprehensive and effective manner by the Government of the Sudan. Continued attacks and obstruction of UNAMID movement and activities, as well as attacks on and the kidnapping of civilians, could be significant causes of alarm, and the Government of the Sudan must do all it can to improve security in Darfur and stop the culture of impunity.

Any sustainable peace process must also address the issue of justice and accountability, and redress for victims of human rights and humanitarian law violations. The African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Darfur, under the leadership of President Mbeki, has our full support for its activities in achieving this goal and its role in democratically transforming the Sudan. In particular, we support the recommendation made by the Panel on ensuring accountability for the legacy of past abuses in order to ensure a peaceful future in the Sudan. We encourage the Government of the Sudan to implement the recommendations of the Panel led by President Mbeki, in particular in the justice sector.

Austria has taken note with concern of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Pre-Trial Chamber's decision of 25 May 2010 and the briefing of Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo on this subject to the Council last Friday (see S/PV.6336). We wish to underline the need for the Government of the Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur to cooperate fully with the ICC. The international community, together with the Government of the Sudan, must continue to work to promote respect for human rights and democracy throughout the entire country.

My country is firmly convinced that seeking peace and securing justice are mutually reinforcing processes. It is true that, in the final outcome, justice can thrive best in an atmosphere of peace, but at the

same time it is also clear that there can be no lasting peace without justice.

My delegation thanks the United Kingdom for the draft presidential statement, which we support.

Mr. Barbačić (Bosnia and Herzegovina): At the outset, let me welcome His Excellency President Mbeki, Chairperson of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for the Sudan; Mr. Menkerios, Special Representative of the Secretary-General; Mr. Gambari, Joint Special Representative; and Mr. Bassolé, Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur, and thank them for their insightful briefings.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which is fundamental and indispensable to peace and stability in the Sudan, is reaching a critical stage. In just more than six months, referendums that will determine the future shape of the Sudan will take place. I would like to reiterate Bosnia and Herzegovina's support for the full implementation of the CPA.

Bosnia and Herzegovina takes positive note of the progress made by the CPA parties on a number of issues, including adoption of related legislation. It is of the utmost importance that the CPA parties engage constructively in order to address outstanding issues with regard to the implementation of the CPA. Border demarcation, the establishment of the conditions for peaceful referendums, and post-referendum arrangements must be prioritized.

The level of cooperation between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan in the pre- and post-referendum periods will determine the destiny not only of the Sudan but of the entire region. We hope that the CPA parties will resolve all outstanding issues in a friendly and peaceful manner for the benefit of their peoples.

It must be made clear that no option can leave any side a loser. If unity prevails, a just power-sharing system must be established. Moreover, the diversity and equality of all regions, including Darfur, have to be respected. On the other hand, if independence is chosen, both sides must unite around the values and principles of friendly relations and good cooperation.

The Sudan is a good example of close cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union. The symbiosis of a universal and

regional organization and their collaboration in Darfur through their hybrid mission, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), have not only contributed to an improved situation on the ground, but strengthened hope and paved the way for peace, as well. Experiences from this joint endeavour will help in anticipating solutions for other conflicts and crises in Africa.

A just solution has to be found for the people of Darfur, who have suffered for too long. A lasting solution for Darfur must include the equal participation by the people of Darfur in the decision-making process and the creation of conditions that will prevent any marginalization of Darfur or its people. Substantial numbers of the population in affected areas and internally displaced persons did not participate in the elections held in April. To address this issue, the Government of the Sudan must find a way to ensure that their voices are integrated into the political process.

Bosnia and Herzegovina supports the political process and mediation efforts in Doha. It is vital that the Doha peace process take place within the timeline of the CPA. As the parties missed an opportunity to conclude peace talks before the elections, it has now become essential to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement for Darfur as soon as possible in order to ensure that its provisions are implemented before the referendum. We call upon all parties to engage constructively to reach a final peace agreement and put an end to the conflict in Darfur.

We commend the African Union High-level Panel and its efforts to reveal the root causes of the conflict in Darfur and marvelous articulation of recommendations for its settlement. The findings of the Panel have also significantly contributed to a better understanding of the situation in the Sudan in its entirety.

It is essential that at this crucial time, regardless of the future status of Southern Sudan, priority be given to capacity-building of its authorities in order to provide security and deliver services to the population. Only a viable Southern Sudan with a strong local structure will contribute to peace and stability within the region.

Bosnia and Herzegovina welcomes the improvement in Chad-Sudan relations and their positive influence on the Doha peace process. Their

cooperation along the border has had a positive impact on the security situation on the ground. There will always be an interconnection between the situation in the Sudan and the peace and stability of the region. The people of the Sudan will resolve their own problems, but an enabling environment in the region will also facilitate positive developments in the Sudan.

The African Union Panel wisely contemplated the interconnection among peace, justice and reconciliation in the Sudan. The Sudanese by themselves, with the assistance of the international community, must find a golden equilibrium among peace, justice and reconciliation in order to enter the new phase of a democratic and prosperous Sudan.

At this stage, it is vital that the Governments of the Sudan and Southern Sudan, as well as the international stakeholders, draw lessons from the elections held in April and utilize all resources to better prepare for conducting the referendums in Abyei and Southern Sudan. It is encouraging that the United Nations Mission in the Sudan has already completed its team for the preparation of the referendums.

In conclusion, at this critical time all peace processes in the Sudan — resolution of the conflict in Darfur, the CPA, and North-South relations — deserve the full attention of the international community. We must all assist the peoples of the Sudan to find their way towards a better future for their country and the entire region.

Mr. Li Baodong (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I would like to thank you, Sir, for convening this meeting of the Security Council on the question of the Sudan. I welcome Mr. Mbeki, Chairman of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Menkerios, Joint Special Representative Gambari and Joint Chief Mediator Bassolé to today's meeting. I thank them for their work to resolve the question of the Sudan.

The Security Council has devoted a great deal of energy to the question of the Sudan. At this critical moment in the peace process in the Sudan, I would like to emphasize the following two points. First, the question of the Sudan is complicated but progress has been achieved. The Sudan is the largest country in Africa. The maintenance of its peace and stability bears on the overall situation of peace in its region and the African continent. Thanks to the tireless efforts of the international community, the framework arrangements

on the question of the Sudan have basically been established and their implementation is proceeding. Progress has been achieved in the peacekeeping deployments and the political negotiation in the Darfur region. The Sudan's national elections were held successfully and preparations are under way for the referendum in the South as the final step in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). These developments demonstrate that the people of the Sudan want stability and that there is strong public support for the political settlement of the question of the Sudan.

However, the question of the Sudan is complex. Its satisfactory resolution will test the political wisdom of the parties concerned. In the coming months, the challenges will be even more daunting. We believe that, so long as the concerned parties prioritize peace and stability in the Sudan and Africa, cooperate in good faith and move towards each other, it will be possible to successfully address the difficulties and challenges in the final stage of the Sudan peace process.

Secondly, it is necessary to fully exploit the unique role of the African Union (AU) in the question of the Sudan, as seen in the diplomatic practice of recent years in Africa in the area of peace and security. The AU's comprehensive involvement in the question of the Sudan is unprecedented. The AU initiated the peacekeeping operations in Darfur and played the role of fire brigade in containing the conflict in Darfur. The AU and the United Nations created the joint operations peacekeeping model in Darfur. The Sudanese Government, the African Union and the United Nations trilateral mechanism has functioned effectively on Darfur. In all this, the African Union has played the role of bridge and link in the international process on the question of the Sudan. This model of cooperation has provided the international community with new experience in handling regional hot spots.

Over the past year, the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur, under Mr. Mbeki, has studied the question of the Sudan in depth and made comprehensive and practical proposals for achieving peace and reconciliation through cooperation in the Sudan. We expect the AU to continue to play an important role in the next stage of the peace process in the Sudan. We believe that the AU will enjoy further success in maintaining peace and stability on the African continent.

China has worked tirelessly to promote the proper resolution of the question of the Sudan. We have actively participated and promoted the dual-track system and the trilateral mechanism so as to build a framework of international cooperation on Darfur. Chinese peacekeepers have always stood on the front line of international peacekeeping in the Sudan. The Government and private sector of China have made practical contributions to the Sudan's economic development and the improvement of people's lives.

We sincerely support the African Union's playing an important role in the question of the Sudan in the future. The Chinese Government will continue to act in a responsible manner to actively promote the peace process in the Sudan and to make its own contributions to peace in Africa.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity.

We welcome the presence of President Mbeki and thank him for his briefing. We also welcome Mr. Menkerios, Mr. Gambari and Mr. Bassolé. We are grateful for their briefings, since they all symbolize the work of the international community. Their actions with respect to the situation in the Sudan are invaluable contributions to the work of this Council in the search for peace and justice in that country.

As has been noted, the Sudan is facing a defining moment for its future. As we move towards the completion of the transitional period established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the challenges to consolidating peace and stability throughout the country remain extensive. Six months before the holding of the national referendum, the situation is a major challenge not only to the country, but also to the international community, which is responsible for ensuring the well-being of the Sudanese people. Hence, a timely and coordinated response is expected from the United Nations and its partners in order to avert any possible return to the armed conflict faced by thousands of Sudanese for more than two decades.

Today, we are analysing the different options for cooperation with the Sudan. Although points of view may differ with respect to identifying priorities, the common denominator remains ensuring a better future for the Sudanese people through peace, dialogue and mutual respect among the parties.

The parties have made some significant progress since the implementation of the CPA began. Nonetheless, important elements of the Agreement remain unfulfilled due largely to a lack of trust among the signatories. That is the first obstacle that we must overcome in the coming months if we want to prepare the conditions for holding a successful referendum. We agree that the priority of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in the coming months must be the preparation for the referendum. The logistical and security support that the Mission can offer the parties is critical to ensuring comprehensive and peaceful participation. The lessons learned from the recent election process, especially with respect to voter registration and the transportation of equipment, will allow the Mission to better respond to the difficulties on the ground.

Nonetheless, and mindful of the resources at the disposal of UNMIS, we must not forget that all efforts must be accompanied by the protection of civilians and the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, since both are complementary to the success of the election process and the outcome of the voting. The parties must have a clear vision of the framework to govern relations among them following the referendum. The international community must do all in its power to facilitate dialogue among the parties and to offer its assistance when requested in order to achieve a satisfactory agreement prior to the ballot.

As the implementation of the provisions of the agreement moves forward, the United Nations will have the opportunity to collaborate in other very important areas, among them the drafting of contingency plans and capacity-building for the Government of Southern Sudan so that it can offer the basic services that its population requires. The drafting of comprehensive contingency plans at the national level must be a priority of the Organization in the coming months. Whatever the end result of the referendum, the international community must stand ready to respond rapidly and effectively to any scenario.

For years, the tragic situation in Darfur has engaged the conscience of millions around the world, including in my country, where broad sectors of society have called on the Security Council to ensure the protection of the civilian population and to resolutely promote a lasting solution to the conflict.

Today, that call takes on particular significance as thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons in that region of the Sudan will find themselves affected by the strategic decisions that the Organization will take following this debate; hence the need to adopt a broad-based approach to the situation in the Sudan and in Darfur. What happens in Darfur must be linked to the broader context of what is happening in the rest of the Sudan.

That holistic vision must be accompanied by a reorganization of the various efforts of the actors on the ground. The international community must maintain close cooperation in order to address the difficult challenges facing the Sudan. The United Nations must maintain a single channel of communication with the African Union High-Level Panel and the various regional initiatives for the good of the political process in that country.

Furthermore, regarding Darfur, instances of progress the ground must serve as the true measures of progress in the political process. In that way, in the coming months, the international community should ensure a cessation of hostilities and the return of all parties to the negotiating table. The Security Council should do its utmost so that all rebel factions join the mediation process under way. The rebel leaders must see that the international community is not prepared to indefinitely support their aspirations to the cost of the civilian population.

Whatever the situation following the referendums, the Sudan will begin a fragile transition period, which will require the support of the countries of the region and the international community. From that standpoint, the United Nations will continue to have an important role in helping the population. By remaining in the Sudan, the Organization will be in a position to continue not only to meet its obligation to maintain international peace and security, but also to work to improve the situation of thousands of people who still face devastating violence and poverty.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council and shall invite Mr. Mbeki to make a few concluding remarks. I give him the floor.

Mr. Mbeki: Perhaps I should say first of all that I was very pleased that the rest of the members of our Panel were able to come to this meeting. Behind me are sitting former Presidents Abubakar and Buyoya, the other members of our Panel.

It would seem to me from the comments that I have been made by Council members here that we are generally in agreement and of one mind about the immediate challenges facing us with regard to all the elements that relate to Sudan — Darfur, Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and so on. Thus, there is general agreement on the kind of thing that is required. I think that it is a very good thing that that sort of consensus has developed within the Security Council. Certainly, from the point of view of those of us who have to attend to the matter of Sudan every day, I think that the comments that have been made here by members of the Security Council will reinforce the cooperation that is taking place among ourselves on a daily basis in Sudan so that we can advance on all of these matters.

The only other point that I would like to make at that regard is that generally we are very optimistic about this. I think the point has been made that the thing that has happened as a result of the elections is that the two principal players, particularly with regard to the CPA — the National Congress Party and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement — have emerged strengthened from the elections. That has of course communicated the message to them of the extreme importance of their cooperating properly so that all the things that need to be done are done.

Therefore, all of us will continue to engage them to ensure that they do indeed live up to their responsibilities, because, without that, we are not going to achieve the solutions that we are looking for in Sudan.

I think that the atmosphere is very encouraging in the sense that there is a commitment to making sure that these things happen despite all the problems and all the challenges. I would like to believe that a strong message from the Security Council to encourage the parties to live up to their responsibility would indeed help in making sure that we advance the entirety of the agenda relating to resolution of the challenges in Sudan.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 12:50 p.m.



Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

6339th meeting

Tuesday, 15 June 2010, 10 a.m.

New York

[Provisional]

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Heller	(Mexico)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Mayr-Harting
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbalic
	Brazil	Mr. Moretti
	China	Mr. Wang Min
	France	Mr. Araud
	Gabon	Mr. Moungara Moussotsi
	Japan	Mr. Okuda
	Lebanon	Mr. Salam
	Nigeria	Mr. Lolo
	Russian Federation	Mr. Churkin
	Turkey	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda	Mr. Rugunda
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Mark Lyall Grant
	United States of America	Mr. Wolff

Agenda

The situation in Cyprus

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/2010/264)

Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/2010/238)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506.



The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/2010/264)

Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/2010/238)

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2010/311, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

I should also like to draw the Council's attention to the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus and to the report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, which have been issued as documents S/2010/264 and S/2010/238, respectively.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I should like to inform the Council that the presidency of the Council has met with the representatives of the parties, who maintain their well-known positions vis-à-vis the item on the Council's agenda. On the basis of those meetings, with the consent of the members of the Council, the presidency has drawn the conclusion that the Council can proceed to take a decision on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Against:

Turkey

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): There were 14 votes in favour and one against. The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 1930 (2010).

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the voting.

Mr. Apakan (Turkey): Having voted against the draft resolution today, I would like to briefly share with the Council the reasons that compelled us to do so.

Turkey's persistent objection has always been to the method through which these resolutions have been adopted and to the language they have contained. Since the adoption of resolution 186 (1964), which set up the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), all Council resolutions extending the mandate of the Force are unfortunately still being formulated as if there were only one side on the island.

We all know that, since 1963, there has not been a joint and constitutional Government representing the whole of Cyprus. Considering the Greek Cypriot Government to be the Government of the whole island has been the main obstacle in the way to finding a just, lasting and comprehensive solution for over 46 years. Therefore, the open consent of the two parties on the island should have been sought.

We wanted this situation to be corrected in today's resolution. Yet, we see once again that that did not happen.

We welcome the elements concerning the Secretary-General's good offices mission contained in today's resolution. Despite misquotations, such as that in the sixth preambular paragraph, where the phrase "if possible" has been added to the wording of the original statement made by the two leaders on the island on 21 December 2009, we believe that the resolution still carries the right messages. Above all, it confirms the common expectation that 2010 will be the year of a solution consistent with the hope expressed by the two leaders and shared by the Secretary-General and most, if not all, of the international community.

I would like to reaffirm that the Turkish side has implemented and will continue to implement the provisions of this and related resolutions. We believe that achieving a mutually acceptable and comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem

within established United Nations parameters, which will safeguard the fundamental and legitimate rights and interests of the two peoples on the island, is possible and within reach. Therefore, Turkey will continue to fully support the Secretary-General's efforts and cooperate with UNFICYP.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): The Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 10.20 a.m.



Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6340th meeting

Tuesday, 15 June 2010, 10.20 a.m.

New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Heller	(Mexico)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Mayr-Harting
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbačić
	Brazil	Mr. Moretti
	China	Mr. Wang Min
	France	Mr. Araud
	Gabon	Mr. Mounkara Moussotsi
	Japan	Mr. Okuda
	Lebanon	Mr. Salam
	Nigeria	Mr. Lolo
	Russian Federation	Mr. Churkin
	Turkey	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda	Mr. Rugunda
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . .	Sir Mark Lyall Grant
	United States of America	Mr. Wolff

Agenda

The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Robert Serry, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General.

It is so decided.

I invite Mr. Serry to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a briefing by Mr. Robert Serry, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. Serry: At the outset, I wish to inform the Council that this briefing will focus mainly on developments relating to Gaza; the Secretariat will report fully on other developments in next month's briefing.

Following the presidential statement of the Security Council on 1 June on the flotilla incident of 31 May (S/PRST/2010/9), the Secretary-General and I have been active in addressing the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, and we renew our urgings for a fundamentally different approach to Gaza, while underscoring United Nations support for all efforts to preserve and promote the broader political process. The Secretary-General has been in contact with a number of regional and world leaders, and I have been engaged on the ground, including with the parties and Quartet colleagues.

I reiterate the Secretary-General's regret over the loss of life and injuries resulting from the use of force during the Israeli military operation, and his condemnation of the acts, which it now appears resulted in the deaths of nine civilians and injuries to at

least 30 others, together with seven soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

By 2 June, 682 detained civilians had been repatriated. Five Israeli citizens were questioned in Israeli custody and conditionally released between 1 and 3 June. The vessels remain in Israeli ports. A further vessel, the *Rachel Corrie*, was intercepted by Israeli naval forces as it sailed for Gaza on 5 June, without violence from any party, and was rerouted with its passengers and cargo to the Israeli port of Ashdod. There continue to be reports of intentions to send further ships from several quarters to try to reach Gaza. I reiterate the Secretary-General's earlier comments that all parties should act responsibly and with caution to avoid any further incident.

In its 1 June presidential statement (S/PRST/2010/9), this Council called for a prompt, impartial, credible and transparent investigation conforming to international standards. The Secretary-General held consultations with the permanent members of the Security Council and a host of other concerned parties on the modalities for complying with the Council's call. In this context, he has proposed an international panel under the aegis of a third party seen as impartial and in which both Turkey and Israel actively participate. He has briefed the leadership of both Turkey and Israel.

On 14 June, the Israeli Prime Minister announced the formation of a public commission to examine the flotilla incident, to be composed of three Israeli members and two international personalities, who will participate as observers. The Secretary-General has taken note of Israel's announcement and recognizes that a thorough Israeli investigation is important and could be consistent with the Secretary-General's own proposals for an international panel. The two combined would fully meet the international community's expectation for a credible and impartial investigation. The Secretary-General's proposal is not incompatible with domestic inquiries; in fact, the two approaches are complementary, so his proposal, accordingly, remains on the table.

Consistent with the wish of this Council for the cargo to reach its destination, as expressed in the presidential statement of 1 June, and after consultations with the parties concerned, I wish to announce that the United Nations is ready to accept this responsibility on an exceptional basis. The United Nations has obtained

the consent of the cargo owners of the three Turkish-registered vessels to take possession of and responsibility for the entire cargo and ensure its timely distribution in Gaza for humanitarian purposes, as determined by the United Nations. The Government of Israel has agreed to release the entire cargo to the United Nations in Gaza, again on the understanding that it is for the United Nations to determine its appropriate humanitarian use in Gaza. We have reason to believe that the de facto authorities in Gaza will respect the independence of United Nations programming in this regard. I appreciate the constructive role played by the Government of Turkey in facilitating this process.

We will begin to operationalize this understanding as soon as possible, maintaining close contact and full transparency. It will be essential for all parties to respect the independence of the United Nations as we undertake this work. It is equally important to stress that the amount of material on the vessels in question, which includes medical and construction supplies, is comparatively modest in scale compared with the needs in Gaza.

It is these needs which must be the focus of immediate action and the Council's attention. The flotilla crisis is the latest symptom of a failed policy. As the Secretary-General has repeatedly stated, the situation in Gaza is unsustainable and the current policy is unacceptable and counterproductive and requires a different and more positive strategy. The closure and blockade of the Gaza Strip need to come to an end.

There is now a welcome international consensus on Gaza. It is fully agreed by the Quartet that there must be a fundamental change to the situation. To this end, Quartet principals have engaged with the Israeli leadership and Quartet representative Blair has had several meetings with the Government. I have been informed that Israel is now conducting a review of its Gaza policy. I believe it is vital that this result in an end to measures that punish the civilian population. It is important that measures taken by all parties be part of a broader strategy to implement resolution 1860 (2009) in all of its aspects.

The basic principle that should guide the policy on Gaza is clear. Everything should be allowed into Gaza unless there is a specific and legitimate security reason. Israel should therefore move from the current policy — whereby only about 116 items are approved

to enter Gaza — to a policy whereby all goods and materials are able to enter Gaza unless there is a legitimate security rationale against it. Even in such cases, existing understandings between Israel and the United Nations, which have enabled some United Nations construction projects to begin recently, demonstrate that even so-called dual use items can enter Gaza and be used for proper civilian purposes.

Accordingly, Israel should facilitate and fast-track United Nations projects on a large scale, particularly in areas such as water and sanitation, energy, education and health. At last month's briefing to the Security Council (see S/PV.6315), I stressed that the needs are immense in these sectors in the face of a collapsing aquifer, a burgeoning student population, pressures on the public health system, and an urgent need for spare parts for the power plant and electricity grid. Other key development projects should also be approved on a similar basis to meet the needs of a growing population, half of whom are under 18 years old. In addition, we strongly hope that exports will now be facilitated at a proper scale, and that the categories of people permitted to enter and leave Gaza will be significantly expanded.

To implement these measures, it will be crucial to expand capacity at commercial crossings between Israel and Gaza. Practical steps should be taken in this regard to reinstate the framework of the Agreement on Movement and Access, including the Palestinian Authority's appropriate presence at crossings. A fundamental change in policy would empower moderation in Gaza while ensuring that its civilian population was not reliant on an illicit economy that empowers smugglers and militants.

It would also begin to address unmet needs in Gaza, which are easily illustrated with a few statistics. Given the state of economic collapse and rising poverty levels, 61 per cent of Gaza's households are food insecure and 80 per cent of the population receives some kind of humanitarian assistance, mainly food and cash assistance. At least 70 per cent of industrial establishments are totally closed, with the remainder working at very low capacity. According to a survey undertaken by the United Nations Development Programme, three-quarters of the damage wrought by Operation Cast Lead — including to homes, schools and hospitals — has not been repaired or rebuilt. Electricity production from the Gaza power plant now stands at 38 per cent of its full capacity, leaving the

majority of the population in Gaza with power cuts of eight to twelve hours per day.

Between 16 May and 13 June, 566 truckloads entered Gaza on average per week, a 6 per cent drop compared to the previous reporting period. This included building materials for the approved United Nations package, on which work is proceeding, as well as for a French project to repair a hospital in Gaza City. Between 15 and 20 May, the Rafah border crossing with Egypt was exceptionally opened for six days, facilitating the entry and departure of thousands of Gazans for humanitarian purposes. Since 2 June, the Egyptian authorities have opened the Rafah crossing for pedestrian travellers to and from the Gaza Strip; some 5,000 Gazans flocked to Rafah on the first day. Egypt destroyed a number of smuggling tunnels and continues to install preventive measures, including steel sheeting, along its border with Gaza. Over the reporting period, eight people died and 14 more were injured in tunnel-related incidents.

On 25 June, Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit will have been in captivity for four years. We call on his captors to urgently allow third-party access to him and to release him immediately. We also note the detention of over 9,000 Palestinians in Israeli jails, among them women and children, and persons detained without charge. We urge the completion of a prisoner exchange agreement, as well as further releases of Palestinian prisoners to the Palestinian Authority.

Since the flotilla incident, the de facto authorities have maintained comparative calm with Israel. Nevertheless, militant groups fired some 29 indiscriminate rockets into southern Israel during the reporting period, causing no injuries. The IDF conducted 10 incursions and 12 air strikes, killing 13 Palestinians, all of whom were alleged militants, and injuring 44, of whom 40 were reportedly civilians, including six women and seven children. We continue to condemn rocket fire, which indiscriminately targets civilians, and acts of disproportionate military force, which endanger civilians. We urge calm and full respect by all parties for international humanitarian law. We are also making it directly clear to interlocutors in Gaza that, just as we urge a significant change in Israel's policy at the crossings, we will be looking for a significant change from Hamas in its policies as well, in particular by declaring an extended ceasefire and acting to prevent all forms of violence against Israel.

During the reporting period, there was a worrying spate of attacks on international and civil society organizations in Gaza. The Secretary-General has condemned the disturbing vandalism of a United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) summer camp for Gazan children on 23 May with accompanying threats to the safety of United Nations personnel. I am, however, pleased to report that the UNRWA summer games, which will provide much-needed recreation and relief from the stresses of living in the Strip for some 250,000 children, have been successful under way in 144 locations since 12 June.

In early June, Hamas security forces broke into the offices of a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including United Nations partners, in Gaza City and Rafah, closing them down and confiscating their equipment. In a statement on 3 June, I called for the reversal of these repressive and unacceptable actions, which only harm Palestinians. The United Nations will continue to discharge its full responsibilities towards the civilian population in Gaza and will engage and work actively with NGO partners.

Despite continuing efforts to promote internal dialogue by Palestinian figures, Hamas continues to refuse the Egyptian-mediated proposal for Palestinian reconciliation. I can therefore report no progress in efforts to reunite Gaza with the West Bank within the framework of the legitimate Palestinian Authority. I would stress here that Palestinian unity is a key component to finding a sustainable solution to the crisis in Gaza. The need for tangible steps on intra-Palestinian reconciliation is cited in resolution 1860 (2009).

I note that on 13 June the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States visited the Gaza Strip, urging an end to the blockade of Gaza and Palestinian reconciliation in order to advance towards legitimate Palestinian aspirations for the creation of an independent Palestinian State as part of a two-State solution.

I have focused on Gaza and will speak only briefly on other issues, pending a fuller briefing next month. The Quartet is agreed that it is vital to push ahead with the proximity talks. Special Envoy Mitchell held a further round of talks with President Abbas on 19 May and with Prime Minister Netanyahu on 20 May, and both sides reaffirmed their commitment to

continue the talks in the aftermath of the flotilla incident. Special Envoy Mitchell visited the region again from Wednesday, 2 June, for a further three days of what he described as constructive and substantive talks, and he is due to return to the region again this week.

I wish to underline to the Council precisely how delicate and urgent these negotiations are. Israel's settlement restraint policy will expire three months from now, while support for President Abbas from the Arab League for continuing negotiations has a similar time frame. Within that time, we must have made sufficient progress at the table and on the ground to enable a move to meaningful direct negotiations. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how a political process can be sustained, much less how negotiations can converge, meaningfully and decisively, on an agreement on the core issues of the conflict. That, ultimately, is the only path to peace.

The proximity talks must be supported by positive actions on the ground, and I urge the parties to implement their obligations and refrain from provocations. This includes Israel's obligation to freeze all settlement activity, including natural growth, to dismantle outposts erected since March 2001, and to reopen Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem. It also includes Palestinian action to combat violence and terror and to continue the reforms that have made important strides in recent years.

I particularly stress the sensitive situation in Jerusalem, where tensions have continued in the reporting period. I also stress the importance of calm in the West Bank, where there have been a number of worrying violent incidents, including Israeli settler attacks on Palestinians and yesterday's attack on an Israeli police patrol, resulting in the death of a policeman, which was condemned by the Palestinian Authority.

The second Palestine Investment Conference was held successfully on 2 and 3 June in Bethlehem, resulting in pledges of almost \$1 billion of investments in Palestinian businesses. This is an encouraging sign of investors' trust in the Palestinian Authority's institution-building efforts, including those to restructure the Palestinian economy and create an enabling environment for investors. Meanwhile, the Authority has received \$491 million to support recurrent budgetary costs. In order to ensure continued

support to the Palestinian Authority reform agenda, a total of \$1.2 billion in external financing is required in 2010.

The Israeli, Palestinian and other members of the International Women's Commission (IWC) met on 1 and 2 June in Madrid, where participants gathered to highlight the tenth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and the work that remains outstanding to ensure its implementation. I will be working with the IWC and other groups in the coming months to ensure that the provisions of the resolution 1325 (2000) and issues relating to the rights and representation of women are advanced in the effort for peace in the Middle East.

Regrettably, I can report no concrete developments on renewing Israeli-Syrian negotiations or on the broader regional aspects of peace. The situation in the occupied Syrian Golan remained stable, although settlement activity continued during the reporting period. A fire was started on 26 May by an Israeli military drill, which destroyed an estimated 5,000 acres.

Turning now to Lebanon, I will be brief, as the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) will be submitted to the Council at the end of this month. The situation in the past month has been stable. Municipal elections were held on four Sundays during the month of May. The elections were conducted in a peaceful and calm atmosphere with the exception of Saida, where some security incidents resulted in injuries but where no fatalities were reported.

Funding for the reconstruction of the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp remains a major concern. There is currently a deficit of \$209 million in funds needed for rebuilding the camp. The United Nations urges the international community to renew its financial support.

The situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon remains quiet. During the period under review, Israeli air violations continued on an almost daily basis, mostly by unmanned aerial vehicles but also by fighter jets.

The Security Council clearly stated two weeks ago that the situation in Gaza is not sustainable (see S/PRST/2010/9). We agree that it must change. There is a welcome Quartet consensus on this and on the policy changes expected from Israel to end the closure

regime in a manner consistent with its legitimate security concerns. This should also be the catalyst for addressing the broader issues as set out in resolution 1860 (2009). The Secretary-General is determined to transform this crisis into an opportunity for real change on the ground, and he will continue to work towards that objective in close cooperation with the Quartet and the Council. The United Nations is already playing a crucial role in addressing the manifold issues confronting Gaza and is ready to significantly expand its interventions.

At the same time, we must not lose track of the need to sustain the proximity talks on the core issues and to buttress them with concrete progress on the ground both in the West Bank, including East

Jerusalem, and in Gaza, with a view to moving to direct talks as soon as possible.

I call on the parties to keep up their cooperative approach in this regard, and I count on the support of the Council to help maintain a climate conducive to peace.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Mr. Serry for his briefing.

In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.

The meeting rose at 10.40 a.m.